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EXTRAJUDICIAL CONSUMER PRESSURE:
AN EFFECTIVE IMPEDIMENT TO
UNETHICAL BUSINESS PRACTICES
Although recent efforts in consumer protection have centered upon
additional legislative assistance, several direct extrajudicial and non-
official forms of self-help can be successfully employed by a
dissatisfied consumer. This comment explores the legal limits on
such forms of action conducted either by an individual consumer or
by an organized group, with a view toward providing a standard
which will enable protestors to remain within the law yet be effective
in their actions.
T he American consumer who has experienced fraudulent,
misleading, or simply unethical conduct' by a merchant with
whom he has dealt has generally pursued one of two alternatives;
initiation of a law suit or referral of the matter to a governmental
I Mercantile practices which come within the opprobrium of this comment include:
contracts with waiver of defenses provisions or which grant the merchant power of attorney;
contracts with confessed judgment clauses or which accelerate payments upon default;
"balloon" payments; "open-end" installment contracts (see note 86 infra); hidden interest
charges; "bait and switch" advertising (see note 37 infra); "lo-balling" (see note 37 infra);
"chain-referral" selling (customer falsely told that he may cancel his indebtedness for goods
by providing the names of potential customers); "free" prize schemes (see note 44 infra);
"fear-sell" (see note 40 infra); fraudulent land sales; fraudulent home improvement plans;
covert substitution of goods; false description of goods; false statement of contract terms;
and generally any scheme which fosters the exchange of low quality for unwarranted high
prices, or which is not responsive to the supply and demand of the marketplace but to the
disparity in knowledge, finances or mobility of the "bargaining" parties. An appropriate
standard would seem to be not caveat emptor, but bona fide and full disclosure of relevant
facts on the part of both parties. See Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d
445 (D.C. Cir. 1965); D. CAPLOVITZ, THE POOR PAY MORE 28-29, 142-54 (1963); W.
MAGNUSON & J. CARPER, THE DARK SIDE OF THE MARKETPLACE 3-26 (1968); Dole,
Consumer Class Actions Under the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act, 1968 DUKE L.J.
1101, 1134; Dole, Merchant and Consumer Protection: The Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices
Act, 76 YALE L.J. 485, 486 (1967); Hester, Deceptive Sales Practices and Form
Contracts-Does the Consumer Have a Private Remedy? 1968 DUKE L.J. 831, 833-35;
Comment, Translating Sympathy for Deceived Consumers into Effective Programs for
Protection, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 395, 397-403 (1966); Comment, Consumer Legislation and
the Poor, 76 YALE L.J. 745, 769 (1967); Note, Installment Sales: Plight of the Low-Income
Buyer. 2 COLUM. J. L. & Soc. PROB. I (1966); notes 37, 40, 44 & 86 infra and
accompanying text; cf REVISED UNIFORM DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACT §§ 2(a)(l), (9),
(l0)& (Il).
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agency. However, neither procedure has been particularly effective
in preventing a recurrence of the objectionable behavior in identical
or modified form, and both are plagued by serious inadequacies.
Seeking redress in the courts is expensive both in time and
money, and the deterrent effect on mercantile fraud posed by
potential legal action is presently negligible due to widespread
consumer ignorance of existing legal remedies! These deficiencies
are particularly acute among impoverished and lower middle class
consumers who traditionally have had little access to legal counsep
and therefore are,, probably less aware of available remedies than
are wealthier consumers accustomed to retaining attorneys, and who
are without sufficient resources to engage counsel or to pay the
court costs which are assessed against the initiator of legal
proceedings.4 While the financial burdens of legal action have been
2 See Sher, The "Cooling-Off' Period in Door-to-Door Sales, 15 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 717,
736 (1968).
The Uniform Consumer Credit Code recently adopted by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws is believed to provide inadequate private consumer
remedies to combat unethical mercantile practices. See generally James & Fragomen, The
Uniform Consumer Credit Code: Inadequate Remedies Under Article V and VI, 57 GEo. L.
J. 923 (1969); Harper, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code: A Critical Analysis, 44
N.Y.U.L. REV. 53 (1969).
3 See CAPLOVITZ, supra note 1, at 175-78.
1 Several writers have suggested that consumers may alleviate existing financial
disadvantage by instituting a class action. See, e.g., Dole, Consumer Class Actions Under
the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act, 1968 DUKE L.J. 1101; Starrs, The Consumer
Class Action-Part 1: Considerations of Equity, 49 B.U.L. REV. 211 (1969). Class actions
also serve to heighten economic and psychological pressure on the merchant and to bar
piecemeal settlements. Dole, supra at 1103.
Another means of minimizing the merchant's economic superiority would be to place the
cost of a successful suit on the defendant-merchant. See, e.g., Comment, Consumer
Legislation and the Poor, 76 YALE L.J. 745, 787 (1967) (proposed unfair sales practices act).
However, the hope of future compensation does not lessen the financial burden of simply
initiating a iaw suit which is presently a substantial barrier to the low income consumer.
Although an attorney cannot provide a client with monetary assistance for living expenses
or general expenses of pending litigation, he may advance to his client "court costs, witness
fees, and expenses resulting from the conduct of the litigation itself." ABA Co Nm. o
PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 288 (1954); See ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL
ETHICS Nos. 10 & 42. This still leaves the impoverished consumer dependent on the possible
generosity of an attorney in order to effectively assert his available right, and he would be
obligated to repay any advances. The new ABA Canons of Professional Ethics appear to
recognize the need for cooperation with the indigent client. "Although this assistance
generally is not encouraged, there are instances when it is not improper to make loans to a
client. For example, the advancing or guaranteeing of payment of the costs and expenses of
litigation by a lawyer may be the only way a client can enforce his cause of action ....
ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS No. 5, ETHICAL CONSIDERATION 5-8 (Final Draft,
1969) (effective Jan. I, 1970).
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removed to some extent for the impoverished by legal aid
programs supported by the local and state bars and government-
sponsored neighborhood legal services,6 nothing has been done to
offset the detrimental effect on job security and income loss caused
by court appearances. 7 Consequently, that segment of the public
which is most susceptible to the shoddy business practice, whether it
be due to lack of education, economic necessity, a prevalence of
marginal businessmen in low income areas,8  or simply a
disinterested attitude,9 is least able to respond with legal action.!"
Moreover, regardless of his socio-economic grouping, the successful
litigant in the common consumer fraud situation is likely to be
discouraged by the size of his recovery, both before and after
counsel extracts his fee, and the extensive delays attendant the legal
process." Where recovery is insubstantial,' 2 the victorious consumer
discovers that public vindication is often his sole satisfaction.
5 See Note, Neighborhood Law Offices. The New Wave in Legal Services for the Poor, 80
HARV. L. REV. 805, 846-48 (1968); cf OFFICE OF ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY, GUIDELINES FOR
LEGAL SERVICES PROGRAMS 19 (1966) (lawyers are furnished to those unable to "pay the fee
of an attorney without jeopardizing their ability to have decent food, clothing, and shelter").
I See Note, Beyond the Neighborhood Office-OEO's Special Grants in Legal Services,
56 GEO. L.J. 742 (1968); 80 HARV. L. REV., supra note 5, at 805-13, 822-28, 833-36.
76 YALE L.J.. supra note 4, at 785.
Cf. CAPLOVITZ, supra note I, at 12-20, 58-63.
Id. at 171-72 ("apathy"); see 76 YALE L.J.,supra note 4, 765 ("hopelessness").
"0See CAPLOVITZ, supra note 1, at 14-15, 170-78; Hester, supra note I; Viles, The War on
Poverty: What Can Lawyers (Being Human) Do? 53 IOWA L. REV. 122, 132-33, 163, 165
(1967); Wall Street Journal, Nov. 12, 1968, at I, col. 6. States one commentator: "IT]he
various poverty programs can be viewed primarily as endeavors to make poor persons more
equal consumers." Dole, supra note 4, at 1102.
Where the merchant initiates legal action to protect his interests, such as seeking recovery
of unpaid installments, a consumer may be subjected to a default judgment without having
had an opportunity to appear if he is the victim of "sewer service." "Sewer service" is the
appellation given the practice of non-delivery of legal process by various process
servers, who, instead of serving a legal document on its intended recipient, deposit the
summons in a convenient sewer or trash can. Wright, The Courts Have Failed the Poor,
N.Y. Times, Mar. 9, 1969, § 6 (magazine), at 104. Unfortunately, the practice appears to
occur most frequently where lower income defendants are involved, partly perhaps, because
ghetto residents may be harder to locate. B. Rubin, D. Caplovitz, E. Sparer & H. Rothwax,
Default Judgments in Consumer Actions: The Survey of Defendants I (Sept. 1965) (reported
in I LEGAL AID DIG. Jan. 10, 1966, at 7-8). The fact of missing or uncooperative parties
has never justified knowingly inadequate service of process in the past, however, and there
would appear to be no rationale for treating the ghetto resident any differently. As a means
of alleviating the problem of "sewer service," it has been suggested that all states should
require service by legal officers or certified mail. 2 COLU.X. L.J. & Soc. PROB.. supra note I.
at 11-12.
tt Viles, supra note 10, at 163, 166-68; Wright, supra note 10, at 100; 114 U. PA. L. REV.,
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State and federal agencies, on the other hand, are regrettably
inefficient, saddled as they need be by time-consuming procedures,t3
and the statutory authority outlining the practice to be regulated by
the appropriate agency has generally been interpreted to preclude
the individual complainant from direct, civil recovery for the injury
suffered.1 4  Moreover, government agencies suffer from an
unfortunate preoccupation with percentages. The individual
complainant will probably be ignored unless his injury is part of a
geographic or national phenomenon of significant danger to the
general public and the agency determines that formal action is in
the public interest.1 5 Thus, he must ordinarily be content with the
supra note 1, at 409.
12 Meager recovery may actually produce a negative effect since the unethical merchant
may deem it economically expedient to continue the objectionable practice, cognizant of the
fact that the danger of a significant adverse recovery is minimal while the opportunity for
profit is substantial.
13 One House Report indicated that it took three years or 1,080 litigation days to remove a
false or misleading advertisement. H. REP. No. 1241, 87th Cong., Ist Sess., 2, 23 (1961). See
Withrow, The Inadequacies of Consumer Protection by Administrative Action, in 1967 NEw
YORK STATE BAR Ass'N ANTITRUST LAW SYMPOSIUM 58, 69-70 (CCH Trade Reg. Rep. ed.
1967).
"See, e.g., FTC-v. Klesner, 280 U.S. 19, 25, 30 (1929) (Federal Trade Commission Act
does not provide private remedies for private wrongs).
Judicial reticence to find statutory sanction for a private action under broad, remedial
statutes such as section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1964), has
been criticized as unnecessarily restrictive and detrimental to the need for uniform legislation
in the area of unfair competition, a subject of substantial public interest. Bunn, The National
Law of Unfair Competition, 62 HARV. L. REv. 987 (1949). Such judicial hesitation seems
particularly vulnerable in view of the broad jurisdictional base which courts have assigned to
the Federal Trade Commission Act, see Millstein, The Federal Trade Commission and False
Advertising, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 439, 454-57, 494 (1964), and the beneficial effect on unfair
competition which potential damage suits could provide. Indeed, section 5 is a statement of
substantive law rather than a directive for administrative regulation and could be readily
interpreted to permit private suits in a manner comparable to implied civil remedies under
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. See, e.g., J.1. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964);
Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798, 802 (E.D. Pa. 1946), modified on other
issues, 83 F. Supp. 613 (E.D. Pa. 1947); Note, Fiduciary Suits Under Rule lob-5, 1968
DUKE L.J. 791, 792 n.9. See generally Note, Implying Civil Remedies From Federal
Regulatory Statutes, 77 HARV. L. REV. 285 (1963). Section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act reads: "Unfair methods of competition in commerce, and unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in commerce, are declared unlawful." 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1964)
(emphasis added).
2One commentator states that the list of referrals sent to federal regulatory agencies upon
which no action is taken is "substantial." Perlin, Consumer Protection-Inadequacies of
Legislation as a Solution, in 1967 NEw YORK STATE BAR Ass'N ANTITRUST LAW
SYMPOSIUM 94, 101 (CCH Trade Reg. Rep. ed. 1967). Governmental preoccupation with
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knowledge that he has reported the incident to the "proper
authorities;" he does not even obtain the satisfaction of public
vindication.
In view of the unsatisfactory nature of either legal or
governmental action, it is suggested that a form of limited, direct,
extrajudicial action by the disgruntled consumer, either' in an
individual capacity or as a member of a group, provides an
acceptable alternative-both in terms of the minimal unsettling
effect which extrajudicial consumer-merchant confrontations
would have on our society and as a potential solution for the
consumer's present impotence vis-a-vis this merchant. Direct action
might provide swift private and public vindication and could result
in remedial gestures by the offending merchant. Direct consumer
action might also serve as a psychological release for an offended
consumer's animosity and frustration,16 which are often increased
when reliance is placed on legal action or governmental
intervention. Assuaging this frustration may have the beneficial side-
effect of reducing any "riot impulse" existing among ghetto
dwellers. 7
Direct action must necessarily be limited, however, and existing
law, particularly as developed in the areas of defamation,
disparagement of product, interference with contractual relations,
and antitrust, delineates those boundaries. This comment explores
requiring dire consequences before departmental inertia is overcome is demonstrated by a
letter sent by the Federal Food and Drug Administration to an officer of the Better Business
Bureau indicating that an investigation of a child's toy would not take place unless proof of
death of a child from the item were submitted. Id. Commentator Perlin also asserted that
this letter was consistent with correspondence from the Drug Administration acknowledging
inquiries on the question of "glue sniffing." Id.
The dependence of governmental agencies upon a national phenomenon and "mass,"
rather than individual, injury is apparently the consequence of time and resource factors
rather than jurisdictional limitations in enabling legislation. See Millstein, supra note 14, at
454-57, 483-87, 494-95.
16 "The right of an individual or group of individuals to protest in a peaceable manner
against injustice or oppression, actual or merely fancied, is one to be cherished and' not to be
proscribed in any well-ordered society. It is an essential prerogative of free men living under
democratic institutions. And it is salutary fof the state, in that it 'serves as a safety valve in
times of stress and strain." Julie Baking Co. v. Graymond, 152 Misc. 846, 847, 274 N.Y.S.
250, 251-52 (Sup. Ct. 1934).
11 See generally, REP. OF THE NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N ON CIVIL DISORDERS 4, 81-82,
139.40 (1968) (Kerner Commission); J. HERSEY, THE ALGIERS MOTEL INCIDENT 29, 279-85
(Bantam Books ed. 1968); Dole, supra note 4, at 1102; Gellhorn, The Law Schools and the
Negro, 1968 DUKE L.J. 1069, 1097; Hester, supra note 1.
Vol. 1969: 1011] 1015
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
the practical limits of direct consumer action in view of existing
law, approaching the question from the viewpoint of the consumer
by discerning the pressure a consumer may exert without fear of
legal retaliation, and suggests possible techniques for applying that
pressure, whether undertaken individually or as part of a
spontaneous group, a loose confederation, a permanent body,. or a
national organization.
Contrary to what may be the popular notion, the ensuing
discussion indicates that the protection given the merchant under
common law does not severely confine the wronged consumer."
Indeed, a close reading of primarily older cases and a realistic
conjecture of the predilection of modern courts suggest that
consumers who have been legitimately harmed may effectively
dramatize their injury without fear of legal reprisal, at least where
they act without malice to redress honest grievances and to promote
a fair and open marketplace. 9 Of course, there is a caveat which
holds true for all of the legal stumbling blocks confronting the
aroused consumer: the more paralyzing the consumer tactic in
terms of its debilitating effect on the merchant's business, and thus
the more pressure brought to bear on the merchant for remedial
action on his part, the greater the likelihood that a court will be
willing to find an improper motive or mode of action and grant an
injunction or damages to the merchant. This is not to say that the
consumer's extrajudicial efforts will be sanctioned only so long as
they are unsuccessful. There is sufficient latitude under existing law
to exert effective pressure on an offending merchant, short of
putting him out of business, which in all probability will induce
him to settle the outstanding claim and, hopefully, to alter his
business practices. Indeed, where the publicized practice is
particularly heinous, judicial permissiveness will probably expand
accordingly, particularly if the consumer can satisfy the court that
he acts not to rid the marketplace of the offending merchant but to
"encourage" him to adopt fair and honest market practices.
Moreover, the very initiation of consumer action, particularly
"See notes 36-76, 104-26 infra and accompanying text.
"This comment generally assumes that the consumer has been the victim of an
opprobrious mercantile practice. See note I supra. Therefore the problem for the consumer is
basically one of guarding against an overreaction in his choice and application of tactics,
avoiding an overstatement of the merchant's conduct, and of displaying an acceptable
motivation.
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where it garners public support, may result in the application of
sufficient pressure from outside sources such as government
agencies, news media, chambers of commerce, or better business
organizations, 20 to cause the merchant to upgrade his business
practices while discouraging him from initiating legal action
against the participating consumers.
EDUCATING FELLOW CONSUMERS
Publication of the alleged grievance is one response to
questionable merchant practices readily available to individual and
group alike. In its simplest form, but not without potentially
damaging consequences to a local merchant, publication transpires
in private conversation. This, method might be especially efficient in
lower income groups where the information can be passed through
social workers or neighborhood legal clinics,' and particularly
efficacious in rural communities where the potential consuming
public is so circumscribed that a detrimental business reputation
can be financially disastrous. In urban areas where there is a ready
and ever-changing supply of consumers and a greater number of
persons must be influenced in order to affect a merchant's business,
larger audiences can be reached by supplanting personal
conversations with the distribution of printed matter and with
speeches to formal organizations or informal gatherings. The
resources of the various news media may be utilized through "letters
to the editor," advertisements, editorials, the promise of an
1 There are a number of voluntary business organizations, such as the approximately 122
independent, non-profit Better Business Bureaus, which are designed to improve "the morals
of the marketplace" by composing market standards, policing advertising, and exposing
unsafe methods or products. Barnum, Consumer Protection and the Anti-trust
Laws-Protection by Voluntary Joint Action, 1967 NEW YORK STATE BAR Ass'N
ANTITRUST LAW SYMPOSIUM 12, 13, 17, 23 (CCH Trade Reg. Rep. ed. 1967).
Unfortunately, self-regulation by merchants has not had a noticeably salutary effect on
market standards. See 114 U. PA. L. REV., supra note I, at 397, 404-09.
21 But cf. 80 HARV. L. REV., supra note 5, at 820-22 (use of lay workers to educate the
poor as to OEO legal services).
2 The freedom of the press to refuse to print an advertisement submitted to it, see, e.g.,
Schuck v. Carroll Daily Herald, 215 Iowa 1276, 247 N.W. 813 (1933); J.l. Gordon, Inc. v.
Worcester Telegram Publishing Co., 343 Mass. 142, 177 N.E.2d 586 (1961), may present a
substantial barrier to a consumer's choice of this method if the offending merchant is a
significant advertiser in the publication in question, thereby placing the publisher under
economic compulsion to refuse the consumer's derogatory advertisement. Nevertheless, it has
been urged that the first amendment necessarily incorporates a constitutional right of access
1017Vol. 1969: 1011I]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
"expose," or a public announcement in support of the cause by an
"irate" public official. The individual crusader, without resources or
connections, can probably be equally effective simply by setting up
the proverbial soap box in front of the merchant's store, or by
using "demonstrative evidence" to publicize his plight. Thus
persons have painted white elephants on their automobiles,2 3 placed
lemons on signs in front of their homes," and in the future one
might expect to see firewood piled in front of a furniture store or a
man dressed in a barrel pacing in front of a home improvement
firm. However, even where the tactics suggested above are
employed solely to educate the public, they pose some dangers to
the participants in the form of legal retaliation.
Defamation
Due to the relatively lighter burden on the plaintiff than on the
defendant and the free rein given the jury in awarding damages,25
probably the most precarious pitfall for the consumer is a suit for
defamation. An action for defamation of the person or business
will lie if the consumer's .derogatory comment on the product or
business reflects on the character of the plaintiff so as to imply a
general want of integrity, 6 or if it imputes conduct inconsistent
with proper performance of the business or trade 7 Thus, epithets
to the press. Barron, Access to the Press-A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARV. L.
REV. 1641, 1649, 1656, 1666-69, 1678 (1967). "A realistic view of the first amendment
requires recognition that a right of expression is somewhat thin if it can be exercised only at
the sufferance of the managers of mass communications." Id. at 1648. While the author
admits that commercial advertising may not require the same access to the press as does
political advertising, id. at 1668, it is certainly arguable that an advertisement by a consumer
exposing a reprehensible merchant practice is not a commercial but a political advertisement.
See note 165 infra. To sustain this position, however, the consumer might have to establish
that he acted primarily to advise others and to remove the objectionable practice rather than
to recover his financial loss. See notes 168-206 infra and accompanying text. See also
Homing, The First Amendment Right to a Public Forum, 1969 DuKE L.J. 931.
1 See, e.g., Carter v. Knapp Motor Co., 243 Ala. 600, 11 So. 2d 383 (1943) (However,
court granted injunction prohibiting defendant from displaying white elephant on automobile).
24 See. e.g., Lawrence v. Atwood, 295 S.W.2d 298 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956).
21 See notes 33-34 infra and accompanying text.
I' L. GREEN, W. PEDRICK, J. RAHL, W. THODE, C. HAWKINS & A. SMITH, TORTS 969
(1968) [hereinafter cited as GREEN]; F. HARPER & F. JAMES, TORTS § 5.2, at 358, § 5.12, at
385-86 (1956) [hereinafter cited as HARPER & JAMES]; S. OPPENHEI.M, UNFAIR TRADE PRAC-
TiCES 322 (2d ed. 1965); W. PROSSER, TORTS § 106, at 762 & nn.9, I1, 763 (1965) [hereinafter
cited as PROSSER]; Comment, The Law of Comnercial Disparagement: Dejamation's Impotent
Ally, 63 YALE L.J. 65,71 (1953).
2' PROSSER § 107, at 776.
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such as "crook," "slippery," or "liar, ' 28 and accusations that a
merchant sells adulterated food29 have been held actionable since
they imply fraud or dishonesty. However, merely belittling the
quality of goods has generally been held not to be defamatory °
Under common law a false statement touching one's trade or
business was slander per se, since it involved interference with one's
very livelihood, and damages were presumed 1 That presumption is
maintained in modern defamation actions, and the actual size of the
recovery may be quite substantial since the general standard
given-those damages reasonably foreseeable or which were the
normal consequence of the defamation-32-is broad enough to
encompass all business losses proximately caused by the slanderous
comment. In addition, where "malice" can be demonstrated,
punitive damages may be awarded 4 Where the irate consumer
engages in numerous conversations or utilizes the mass media to
communicate defamatory remarks, he also risks compounding the
eventual damage recovery because of multiple publication.3 5
21 Pendolpho v. Bank of Benson, 273 F. 48 (9th Cir. 1921) ("crook"); Peterson v. Western
Union Tel. Co., 65 Minn. 18, 67 N.W. 646 (1896) ("slippery"); Smith v. Lyons, 142 La.
975, 77 So. 896 (1918) ("liar"); Paxton v. Woodward, 31 Mont. 195, 78 P. 215 (1904)
(same); HARPER & JAMES § 5.2, at 357.
"See, e.g., Mowry v. Raabe, 89 Cal. 606, 27 P. 157 (1891); PROSSER § 107, at 776.
1 63 YALE L.J., supra note 26, at 71, 72; see, e.g., Dooling v. Budget Publishing Co., 144
Mass. 258, 10 N.E. 809 (1887); Bosi v. New York Herald Co., 33 Misc. 622, 68 N.Y.S. 898
(Sup. Ct. 1901).
*' PRossER § 107, at 776.
2 Id. at 780.
1 E.g., Proto v. Bridgeport Herald Corp., 136 Conn. 557, 72 A.2d 820 (1950).
31 E.g., Conrad v. Dillingham, 23 Ariz. 596, 206 P. 166 (1922); Cotton v. Fisheries
Products Co., 181 N.C. 151, 106 S.E. 487 (1921). In the context of this comment (see note
19 supra) it is unlikely that punitive damages would be assessed against a defendant-
consumer since he persumably would only be guilty of overreacting to 6r exaggerating the
merchant's unethical conduct. However, if in addition to uttering, false statements the
consumer acted vindictively and with the intention of destroying the merchant's business,
punitive damages might properly be awarded.
3 The minority American position, which is known as the English "multiple publication"
rule, treats each copy of a newspaper which reaches the hands of a third party as a separate
publication of the defamatory statement, giving rise to a distinct cause of action. See
Brunswick v. Harmer, 117 Eng. Rep. 75 (Q.B. 1849); Leflar, The Single Publication Rule,
25 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 263-65 (1953); Prosser, Interstate Publication, 51 MICH. L. REV.
959, 960-62 (1953). The rule has been criticized because of the multiplicity of suits to which
a defendant may be subjected for an essentially single tortious act and because of the
consequent stockpiling of damage recoveries, and has been replaced in most American
jurisdictions by the "single publication" rule. The latter treats a complete printing of a
newspaper as a single publication permitting only a single cause of action, although the
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Furthermore, while damages are presumed, a jury is likely to be
influenced by the extent of the audience in ascertaining those
damages and in determining whether malice was present. Thus,
there would seem to be little difference in the potential liability for
defamation between a single speech to a large audience or an
advertisement in a local newspaper of limited circulation and
numerous informal conversations.
However, despite the potential liability, the defenses available
against a defamation suit would appear adquate to shield the
careful, bona fide complainant. Since one mistake does not
constitute a behavior pattern, an accusation of a single act of
impropriety is insufficient to support a suit for defamation, unless
special damages are present or the act imputes a general want of
integrity or habitual conduct3 Thus, a consumer subjected to a
"bait and switch" maneuver3 7 could safely disclose that he had been
induced into the store by an advertisement promising a most
advantageous price on a "like new" washing machine, only to be
confronted by a six-year-old wringer model and a salesman
plaintiff can demonstrate the broad distribution of the writing when proving damages. See
Leflar, supra, at 268-70; Prosser, supra, at 962-65. Unfortunately, courts have been reluctant
to extend the "single publication" rule beyond state lines; thus the entry into another state
may give rise to distinct causes of action. See, e.g., O'Reilly v. Curtis Publishing Co., 31 F.
Supp. 364 (D. Mass. 1940). But see Hartmann v. Time, Inc., 166 F.2d 127 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 334 U.S. 838 (1948).
At least seven jurisdictions apply the "multiple publication" rule or a variation thereof,
such as a new cause of action in every forum in which there is publication. Harmann v.
American News Co., 69 F. Supp. 736, 738 (W.D. Wis. 1947), affd, 171 F.2d 581 (7th Cir.
1948); Holden v. American News Co., 52 F. Supp. 24, 32 (E.D. Wash. 1943); Gallegos v.
Union-Tribune Publishing Co., 195 Cal. App. 2d 791, 797, 16 Cal. Rptr. 185, 189 (1961);
Firstamerica Dev. Corp. v. Daytona Beach News-Journal Corp., 196 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 1966);
Louisville Press Co. v. Tennelly, 105 Ky. 365, 370, 49 S.W. 15, 16 (1899); Staub v, Van
Beuthuysen, 36 La. Ann. 467, 469 (1884); Renfro Drug Co. v. Lawson, 138 Tex. 434, 443,
160 S.W.2d 246, 251 (1942).
11 HARPER & JAMES § 5.12, at 385; PROSSER § 107, at 775-77.
In its simplest form, the "bait and switch" scheme consists of an advertisement of a
product which the merchant does not intend to sell or has in very limited numbers, but which
serves as a lure to the prospective purchaser. The buyer's interest is then transferred to
another product, generally higher priced or with a higher profit margin, as soon as the buyer
enters the store or the seller the buyer's home. See W. MAGNUSON & J. CARPER, supra note
1, at 9-12; see note I supra and text following.
A comparable tactic is "lo-balling." The merchant, often an appliance or car repairman,
advertises his services at a bargain price as a calculated means of enticing the consumer to
utilize those services. Once in possession of the appliance or automobile, the merchant is free
to exact high prices for unnecessary repairs. Id. at 12-13; see note I supra.
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offering a "deal" on a brand new washer-dryer combination.
However, if the consumer's statements were inaccurate, and if he
also suggested that the incident was not the first in his experience
with the plaintiff, or perhaps even if he merely added a comment to
the effect that "I'm not surprised," he would risk liability for
defamation. A simple factual description of the events which
transpired, free of personal vindictives or innuendoes, is thus the
essence of the "single act" defense.
The defense of provocation is also available to the consumer,
although it would rarely- seem .to apply. For example, should the
merchant defame the consumer for failure to make payment, the
latter could counter with a defamatory statement of a comparable
order?8 However, the defense is designed to permit a person to
defend and clear his own reputation and not to license
indiscriminate defamation. Thus, the retort must be relevant to the
offense charged and be made in good faith?9 In the example above,
the consumer might incorrectly publish that the merchant
habitually over-charged on his bills and remain within the
provocation privilege, but if the consumer falsely alleges that the
merchant induced purchases by employing a "fear-sell" technique, 0
he would presumably be beyond the perimeters of the defense.
Of probably greater utility and protection than the above are
the other privilege defenses. The consumer could validly claim that
his remarks were absolutely privileged when the plaintiff-merchant
had given his consent to the publication, as where publication
occurs during an arbitration agreed to by the parties or where the
merchant dares the consumer to publicize the issue, convinced that
no one will believe the accusations. A qualified privilege exists
where a person making a defamatory comment can demonstrate
either that he was attempting to safeguard the interests of another
" HARPER & JAMES § 5.17, at 401.
' Id.; PROSSER § 110, at 805-06; cf. Kemart Corp. v. Printing Arts Research
Laboratories, Inc., 146 F. Supp. 21 (S.D. Cal. 1956) (defendant's charge of patent
infringement in response to plaintiff's public denial of infringement was privileged where
made in good faith and reasonable belief).
11 The "fear sell" is produced by the consumer's ignorance of the authority and identity of
public inspectors. Thus a plumber pays a personal visit posing as a local health inspector,
inspects the plumbing, warns the owner that he is subject to a fine if the plumbing is not
replaced, and then agrees to replace the "defective" plumbing for an appropriate fee. W.
MAGNUSON & J. CARPER, supra note 1, at 21-23; Hester, supra note 1, at 833. See note 1
supra.
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unable to protect himself or that there was a common interest
between the commentator and the recipient.! The first is generally
limited to situations where the publisher has a legal or moral duty
to protect another.42 However, the privilege has been applied to the
warning of a present or prospective employer of the misconduct or
bad character of an employee 3 and thus should also be available
when a victim of a "free" prize scheme" acts in good faith and
with a reasonable belief in his accusation to warn a prospective
consumer of the device. Although evidence that the neighbor
solicited the publisher's advice would strengthen this position, the
privilege has not yet been applied in this manner, and the
consumer's intervention might be deemed officious intermeddling.
The second limited defense, that of "common interest," confers
both individual and group immunity 5 and has been utilized to
protect members of various formal organizations.' Thus, it might
be particularly useful where the defendant consumer is a member of
a consumer organization and makes the defamatory statement to
other members in the course of the organization's regular
proceedings. It should be noted, however, that the privilege is
tightly limited and may be lost if the defamation exceeds the
group's interest,' 7 if communicated to non-members,"8 or if made in
' E.g., Willenbucher v. McCormick, 229 F. Supp. 659, 663-65 (D. Colo. 1964); Browning
v. Gomez, 332 S.W.2d 588 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960). See generally Iverson v. Frandsen, 237
F.2d 898 (10th Cir. 1956); Fairbanks Publishing Co. v. Francisco, 390 P.2d 784, 793
(Alaska 1964); Terry v. Hubbell, 22 Conn. Supp. 248, 167 A.2d 919 (Super. Ct. 1960); Mont-
gomery v. Philadelphia, 392 Pa. 178, 140 A.2d 100 (1958); Lathan v. Journal Co., 30 Wis. 2d
146, 140 N.W.2d 417 (1966).
42 E.g., Ridgeway v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 139 F. Supp. 290 (E.D. Va. 1948); Schlaf v.
State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 15 111. App. 2d 194, 145 N.E.2d 791 (1957).
" PROSSER § 110, at 807-08 & nn.97-98.
" Under the "free" prize scheme, the "winner" receives one item supposedly free, but
must agree to purchase other items at a stated price which, when examined, reimburses the
donor for both the initial "free" item and the subsequent ones. For an example of this
scheme see Hester, supra note 1, at 834-35.
41 GREEN 1188-89.
1 See, e.g., Bereman v. Power Publishing Co., 93 Colo. 581, 27 P.2d 749 (1933) (labor
union paper); Peterson v. Cleaver, 105 Neb. 438, 181 N.W. 187 (1920) (fraternal
association); Slocinski v. Radwan, 83 N.H. 501, 144 A. 787 (1929) (church); Herndon v.
Melton, 249 N.C. 217, 105 S.E.2d 531 (1958) (church).
11 See Willenbucher v. McCormick, 229 F. Supp. 659, 663 (D. Colo. 1964); PROSSER
§ 110, at 811. Presumably, a consumer organization's statement of purpose would be
relevant in determining whether the group's interest had been exceeded.
" PROSSER § 110, at 811.
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bad faith.49 The protection afforded by the common interest defense
would presumably permit a local or national consumer
organization to exchange freely among members inforniation on
mercantile practices and to plan educational and pressure
campaigns against offending merchants. Where the group is less
clearly delineated, as where neighbors meet to discuss merchant
behavior, its members may have difficulty in persuading a court
that they fall within the common interest defenses, particularly if
some persons in attendance when a defamatory statement is made
elect not to participate further or indicate that they were ignorant
of the meeting's purpose prior to its inception. Arguably, however,
courts should not restrict the privilege to formal organizations. The
rationale generally stated in justification of the privilege-that it is
an extension of the privilege of self-protection 5-- would appear to
be broad enough to warrant extension of the privilege to persons
congregating in good faith to redress real or imagined market
grievances. Indeed, the proper analysis would seem to require
courts to search for a common interest and evidence of good faith,
rather than a formal organizational structure. This is not to say,
however, that the common interest privilege should apply to
indiscriminate publication of defamatory remarks by consumers to
persons not within their common interest "group," be it temporary
or permanent.
Legal immunity may also be conferred for an honest expression
of opinion on matters of legitimate public interest. Known as the
"fair comment" privilege, it applies most frequently to criticism of
public officials or art forms ! While the underlying facts must be
emphasized in the opinion expressed,52 a bona fide public purpose,
"' GREEN 1188-89. The authors of this casebook define the "common interest" privilege as
"[a] communication made in good faith on any subject in which the person communicating
has an interest, or in reference to which he has a duty . . . if made to a person having a
corresponding interest or duty, even though it contains matter which without this privilege
would be actionable." Id. at 1188. However, the cases cited by the authors in support of
their definition suggest a narrower application of the privilege. Thus communications
between members of formal groups are protected (see note 41 supra) but a letter from one
shareholder to another about plaintiff's defrauding of the corporation is not. Chambers v.
Leiser, 43 Wash. 285, 86 P. 627 (1906), nor are telegrams between shareholders concerning
fitness of a corporate director, Ashcroft v. Hammond, 197 N.Y. 488, 90 N.E. 1117 (1910).
GREEN 1188; see note 39 supra and accompanying text.
"See, e.g., Beauharnais v. Pittsburgh Courier Publishing Co., 243 F.2d 705 (7th Cir.
1957); Julian v. American Business Consultants, Inc., 2 N.Y.2d 1, 137 N.E.2d 1, 155
N.Y.S.2d 1 (1956).
52 HARPER & JAMES § 5.28, at 456.
1023Vol. 1969: 1011]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
as contrasted with a desire to harm the plaintiff, is of paramount
importance, since the privilege is grounded in the public's need to
be informed on public issues and the constitutional protection given
free speech5 3 Arguably, therefore, a good faith attempt to expose a
pernicious mercantile practice ought to fall within the ambit of the
privilege, particularly since the free and accurate exchange of
information is thought to be an essential ingredient of competition
in a free market system.
While it is true that extending the fair comment privilege to
economic interests might provide a ready avenue of abuse, the
privilege which is abused will be lost as a defense. Thus, where
malice, unreasonable communication or unreasonable belief in the
statement is demonstrated, the privilege is avoided and the burden
of proving a lack of abuse is placed on the party asserting the
defense.54 Moreover, the merchant can always utilize the public
forum to rebut the derogatory remarks. Therefore, there would
appear to be sufficient procedural safeguards to justify broadening
the scope of the fair comment privilege to include good faith
expressions of opinion by consumers where those opinions are
13 Julian v. American Business Consultants, Inc., 2 N.Y.2d i, 7-11, 137 N.E.2d I, 5-8, 155
N.Y.S.2d 1, 7-9 (1956).
Although the modem developments by the Supreme Court concerning the right to privacy
and first amendment rights have generally involved "public officials" or "public figures,"
they do evince a desire to avoid the constriction of comments on issues of interest to the
public. See Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379
U.S. 64 (1964); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). Furthermore, in stating
the holding of Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967) Mr. Justice Brennan described the New
York privacy statute as being without power "to redress false reports of matters of public
interest in the absence of proof that the defendant published the report with knowledge of its
falsity or in reckless disregard of the truth." Id. at 387-88 (emphasis added). Such a
standard might well protect some false comments on a merchant's practices, even without a
finding that he was a "public figure." The issue is far from clear, however, since Justice
Brennan expressly distinguished this statutory privacy action from one sounding in libel.
"Were this a libel action, the distinction which has been suggested between the relative
opportunities of the public official and the private individual to rebut defamatory charges
might be germane. And the additional state interest in the protection of the individual
against damage to his reputation would be involved." Id. at 391.
' PROSSER § 110, at 822. As a general rule once the defendant demonstrates that he is
protected by a qualified privilege the burden is on the plaintiff to establish abuse of that
privilege. See, e.g., Willenbucher v. McCormick, 229 F. Supp. 659, 663-65 (D. Colo. 1964);
Bakhshandeh v. American Cyanamid Co., 211 F. Supp. 803, 808 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); Hogan v.
New York Times Co., 211 F. Supp. 99, 108-09 (D. Conn. 1962); Flannery v. Allyn, 47 III.
App. 2d 308, 319, 198 N.E.2d 563, 568 (1964). Contra, Arvey Corp. v. Peterson, 178 F.
Supp. 132, 137 (E.D. Pa. 1959) (applying Pennsylvania law).
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accompanied by a factual recitation of the dispute 5 The latter
requirement would permit the merchant publicly to refute the
charges, relating his own version without having to resort to
meaningless and inflammatory invective. As is true of the common
interest privilege, however, the courts have not yet interpreted fair
comment to include consumer comment.
One case which can be read to lend support to an expanded
application of the fair comment privilege is Dempsky v. Double.56
In the midst of an official investigation concerning the misuse of
public property, a private individual wrote a letter to the county
controller charging that a county employee had used a county
vehicle in the remodeling of his home. A copy of the letter was also
sent to the League of Women Voters. The employee lost nis job for
the violation alleged in the complaining letter and brought a libel
action. Finding that the writer had acted upon proper occasion and
motive, in an appropriate manner and on reasonable and probable
cause, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the trial court's
grant of a compulsory nonsuit 7 Perhaps even more significantly,
the court was also satisfied that the letter to the League of Women
Voters was not actionable. Since the letter had been sent to a group
interested in good government and was intended to serve the
"'public welfare" rather than a private motive, the court was of the
opinion that it was conditionally privileged." ' The League of
Women Voters' claim to good government would appear to be no
more substantial than that of any one citizen of the county in
question. Thus, if it is permissible to communicate with persons
other than an alleged wrongdoer's immediate superiors or perhaps
the proper elected officials, it would seem logical to sanction
county-wide publication rather than to limit the privilege to a self-
appointed body which may or may not act to represent the local
citizenry. So read, Dempsky would seem to sanction consumer
comment where made in a reasonable manner,.9 without malice,
and in the public interest."
'See Dempsky v. Double, 386 Pa. 542; 126 A.2d 915 (1956).
" 386 Pa. 542, 126 A.2d 915 (1956).
Id. at 547-48, 126 A.2d at 917-18.
' Id. See GREEN 1244-45. But see Flotz v. Moore MeCormack Lines, Inc., 189 F.2d 537
(2d Cir. 1951) (false statements maliciously made to F.B.I. held actionable).
9 If, for example, a merchant used newspaper advertisements to implement a "bait and
switch" routine, see note 37 supra, a reasonable response by a victimized consumer would
appear to be the placing of his own counter-advertisement as close to the merchant's
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Despite the significance of these limited defenses, the primary
protection for the wronged consumer against a defamation action is
truth, which provides a complete defense in all but eleven
jurisdictions."' Thus, if broad, emotional words are avoided and if
the consumer honestly relates the events which transpired rather
than his opinions or conclusions concerning the plaintiff's
character, liability may be avoided.6 2 Candor is essential since the
defendant is liable for any false innuendoes or imputations created
by his speech or actions. For this reason, a person using
"demonstrative evidence ' 63 to gain attention should also carry a
sign explaining fully the events which prompted his demonstration,
and a speaker should forsake invective for fact. Since the burden of
proving truth lies with the defendant, 4 offending advertisements or
contracts and shoddy merchandise should be preserved for
presentation at trial. As a practical matter, however, the
advertisement as possible, setting forth in factual terms exactly what is misleading about the
merchant's advertisement and the events which transpired when he responded to the
merchant's advertisement. Nevertheless, where the local newspaper is economically dependent
on merchant advertisements such as the one in question the consumer may have difficulty in
securing acceptance and publication of his "anti-ad." See note 22 supra.
The Supreme Court cases of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), and
Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967), which emphasized the fair comment exception to
defamation and privacy actions where a legitimate public interest or a newsworthy event was
involved, would appear to support an expanded area for protected consumer comment, The
basis of those opinions, the importance of the first amendment guarantee of free speech, is
also central to consumer comment, and the public's interest in an open and just marketplace
is certainly a legitimate public concern. But cf Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 284 F. Supp. 925
(C.D. Cal. 1968) ("quack" doctor exposed by national magazine did not thereby become public
figure; damages for invasion of privacy awarded).
11 HARPER & JAMES § 5.20, at 415. The defendant need not prove literal truth, but only
that his statement was "substantially true." PROSSER § 11, at 825. Of the eleven
jurisdictions in which truth is not a complete defense, six require publication for justifiable
ends, two require that publication be made for "public information," and three demand
good motives in addition to truth. HARPER & JAMES § 5.20, at 416 n.6. See also GREEN 1178-
79; PROSSER § 109, at 795.
12 See PROSSER § 11, at 825-26. Use of analogy from misrepresentation cases might allow
the defendant to introduce evidence of complaints from other consumers similarly situated,
as justification for the opinion expressed. See generally C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 164
(1954).
1 See text accompanying notes 23-24 supra.
64 E.g., Borg v. Boas, 231 F.2d 788, 792 (9th Cir. 1956); Lipman v. Brisbane Elementary
School Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 224, Z33, 359 P.2d 465, 469 (1961); Fowler v. Donnelly, 225 Ore.
287, 292, 358 P.2d 485, 488 (1960); see Perry v. Hearst Corp., 334 F.2d 800 (Ist Cir. 1964)
(truth is an affirmative defense).
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sympathies of the jury are likely to be with the defendant, and
where it is the defendant's word against the merchant's, the
merchant's action will probably fail.
A strong non-legal safeguard which may also operate to
insulate the consumer from a defamation action is the merchant's
desire to avoid unfavorable publicity. Thus, where the consumer
merely engages in private conversations or simply speaks to a
group of consumers who, in turn, seek to pressure a merchant by
conferring directly with him, a jury would properly be skeptical of
a claim of significant injury to the merchant's reputation
precipitated by the speaker's false statement. However, the greater
the audience and the more substantial the economic threat the con-
sumer poses, the more likely and the more justifiable a defamation
action becomes.
Disparagement
The courts have often confused disparagement or "trade libel"
with defamation of a business or of an individual.15 As it is
generally defined today, however, commercial disparagement
encompasses all false statements about the quality of a product or
service intended to cause financial harm and which have that
result. 6 Thus, where the goods or services of the merchant are
attacked, rather than his personal integrity, an action for
disparagement, not defamation; properly lies.
The elements of disparagement are more rigorous than those of
defamation. Not only must the plaintiff prove the falsity of the
defendant's charge by demonstrating the quality of the goods
disparaged, but he must also show that there was no applicable
privilege, that actual financial loss resulted, that the loss was
caused by the false utterance, and that "malice ' 6 7 or "bad faith"
IGREEN 967-70; PROSSER § 122, at 939-40; Developments in the Law-Competitive
Torts, 77 HARv. L. REV. 888, 893 (1964); 63 YALE L.J., supra note 26, at 70-72, 74, 97; C
Steward v. World-wide Auto. Corp., 20 Misc. 2d 188, 189 N.Y.S.2d 540 (Sup. Ct. 1959)
(plaintiff uncertain as to how to frame cause of action).
The classic work on disparagement is Smith, Disparagement of Property, 13 COLum. L.
REV. 13, 121 (1913).
"See, e.g., Maytag Co. v. Meadows Mfg. Co., 45 F.2d 299 (7th Cir. 1930); Brentwood
Pharmacy, Inc. v. Sheppard, 229 N.Y.S.2d 511 (Sup. Ct. 1962) (oral statement during
picketing that drugstore was scene of abortion); 77 HARv. L. REV., supra note 65.
"Commentators disagree as to the need for a showing of malice. Compare GREEN 968,
and PROSSER § 122, at 944-45 with HARPER & JAMES § 6.1, at 479, 481. See also 63 YALE
L.J., supra note 26, at 78-79.
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was present 8 Conversely, the defendant may avoid liability either
by demonstrating a qualified privilege comparable to those
available under defamation, by establishing truth, or by satisfying
the court that the plaintiff had failed to prove the falsity of
defendant's statement. The qualified privilege, which arises from a
lack of malice and a right to protect oneself or others, may be lost
if publication is excessive, if the defendant knows the statement is
false, or, obviously, if malice is present," but apparently sincere
belief in the truth of the assertion, however unfounded, is sufficient
to sustain the privilege. 0 Moreover, although disparagement may
result by implication,7' expressions of opinion are not generally
actionable.72
Modern decisions are divided as to the particularity required to
prove special damages, but the general trend is to demand at least
proof of a specific overall decline in sales following the trade libel.73
Upon making this proof, the plaintiff can recover for lost sales,
any loss to present marketability, the reasonable expenses incurred
in vindicating the product, and, where the product is unique, the
decrease in market value 4 However, the plaintiff must demonstrate
actual economic injury, not merely mental suffering or future loss,
and recovery is presently denied for loss of good will, due to its
speculative nature.7
"See Diapulse Corp. v. Birtcher Corp., 362 F.2d 736 (2d Cir. 1966); GREEN 968, 971-72;
S. OPPENHEIM, supra note 26, at 322; PROSSER § 122, at 943-47; 63 YALE L.J., supra note
26, at 75. See generally Smith, supra note 65, at 121.
One writer would remove the truth defense as to competing merchants. Wolff, Unfair
Competition by Truthful Disparagement, 47 YALE L.J. 1304, 1320 (1938).
The Restatement of Torts would impose liability in some circumstances for expressions of
opinion not held by the publisher. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 627 (1938). See S. OPPENHEIM,
supra, at 323-24. It must be remembered, however, that this view was formulated in a
business context to restrict unfavorable comments by a competing merchant as to the quality
of goods of a competitor.
"See, e.g., Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Jones Super Serv. Station, 188 Ark. 1075, 70 S. W.2d 562
(1934); Frega v. Northern N.J. Mortgage Ass'n, 51 N.J. Super. 331, 143 A.2d 885 (1958);
Olsen v. Kidman, 120 Utah 443, 235 P.2d 510 (1951); PROSSER § 122, at 945, 948.
"' PROSSER § 122, at 947-48. But see 77 HARv. L. REV., supra note 65, at 893-95
(reasonable belief in truth not a defense).
71 PROSSER § 122, at 942; 63 YALE L.J., supra note 26, at 65, 75.
U S. OPPENHEIM, supra note 26, at 323; cf. Wolff, supra note 68, at 1335.
73 GREEN 971-72; PROSSER § 122, at 946-47. See Note, Trade Libel and its Special
Damage Requirement, 17 HAsTINGS L.J. 394 (1965); Comment, Trade Disparagement and
the "Special Damage" Quagmire, 18 U. CHt. L. REv. 114 (1950).
7' 63 YALE L.J., supra note 26, at 96.
75 See, e.g., Fowler v. Curtis Publishing Co., 182 F.2d 377 (D.C. Cir. 1950); Brown v.
Barnes, 133 Colo. 411, 296 P.2d 739 (1956); Trachtenberg Bros. v. Henrietta Stein, Inc., 64
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In short, an action for disparagement carries an onerous burden
for the plaintiff, and consequently, it does not pose as serious a
threat to the complaining consumer as does a defamation action.
For example, were a consumer publicly to berate the shoddy
furniture sold by a merchant without referring to the merchant
himself, his honest and unemotional opinion as to the general
quality of the goods would not appear to be subject to an action for
disparagement. Should a jury find that the goods were actually of
the quality represented by the merchant, the complainant would be
protected either by a qualified privilege or by having couched his
comments in terms of an opinion. Furthermore, if both of these fail
to immunize the consumer, the merchant still faces the difficult
task of proving causation and actual economic injury. Once
damages are shown, however, the jury will have less flexibility than
in a defamation suit, and, therefore, the sincerity and good
intentions of the consumer will not be effective in lessening the size
of the verdict.76
Interference With Economic Relations
In an action for interference with contractual relations,
designated a prima Jacie tort, the defendant's motive frequently
determines liability.77 Because the tort only circumscribes
intentional interference with an existing contract known or
reasonably evident to the defendant,'78 an impersonal or disinterested
motive will probably protect the defendant, whereas the courts
disagree as to a defendant who is admittedly pursuing selfish ends."
N.Y.S.2d 565 (Sup. Ct. 1946); 63 YALE L.J., supra note 26, at 90-91; 77 HARV. L. REV.,
supra note 65, at 899-902.
,1 Lack of malice and bona fides will still be important in sustaining the qualified privilege,
however.
7 HARPER & JAMES § 6.12, at 515; PROSSER § 123, at 951; cf. Steward v. World-Wide
Auto. Corp., 20 Misc. 2d 188, 189 N.Y.S.2d 540, 548-55 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
13 GREEN 877; 77 HARV. L. REV., supra note 65, at 960-61. As defined by Green, a prima
facie tort is an "intentional injury, without just cause or excuse, to trade or other profitable
relation enjoyed by the victim." GREEN at 995. See also Annot., 16 A.L.R.3d 1191 (1967).
As a general rule, liability for negligent interference with contractual relations does not
exist; nonetheless, in a few instances policy considerations have justified recovery. See
HARPER & JAMES § 6.10. Prosser suggests that negligent conduct is actionable under an
action for interference with prospective advantage, see notes 93-98 inJra and accompanying
text, if a special relationship exists. PROSSER § 124, at 976-77; citing Lucas v. Hamm, 56
Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 987 (1962) (negligent
drafting of will), and Ward v. Arnold, 52 Wash. 2d 581, 328 P.2d 164 (1958).
7' PROSSER § 123, at 966, 968. Actual damage must have been sustained, and the fact that
the plaintiff has successfully litigated a separate action against the breaching party is
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Unlike actions for defamation or disparagement, the consumer
cannot rely on the truth of his statement as a complete defense.80
The consumer can, of course, show that there was no existing
contract between the merchant and a third party or that the
consumer acted for altruistic reasons, the latter being an
application of the privilege concept and requiring the court to
balance the competing interests 1 The pertinent factors in any such
balancing process have long been established: the position of the
parties; the grounds for the breach; the means employed to procure
the breach; the relation of the defendant to the breaching party;
and the defendant's motive. 2
Virtually all the cases in this area involve competing
merchants;8 yet, if it is proper to weigh the respective interests of
merchants, then the same process would seem appropriate between
a merchant and a noncompeting consumer. The public interest in
exposing fraudulent or misleading business practices in order for
the public to avoid them and in order to purify the marketplace
should be argued to the court in asserting the privilege and
irrelevant. See HARPER & JAMES § 6.5, at 490-91; Carpenter, Interference with Contract
Relations, 41 HARV. L. REV. 728, 732 (1928). The size of the award has been computed
under one of three methods: normal contract damages determined by the contract breached;
tort damages computed as in a normal negligence recovery; or an intentional tort recovery,
including unforeseen expenses, mental suffering, damage to reputation, and punitive damages.
PROSSER § 123, at 972; Note, Interference With Contractual Relations: A Common
Measure of Damages, 7 SANTA CLARA LAW. 140 (1966). Since the cause of action is
designed to protect the interest of the plaintiff in seeing that his contractual relationships are
secure, and not to compensate him for loss of his bargains, the intentional tort recovery
would seem the more appropriate method. 7 SANTA CLARA LAW., supra at 147. However, if
the courts accept this method, the prima facie tort will pose a greater threat to a disgruntled
consumer.
ASee HARPER & JAMES § 6.5, at 490; 77 HARV. L. REV., supra note 65, at 960. But see
note 98 infra and accompanying text noting that truth is a defense to an action for interference
with prospective advantage.
1t HARPER & JAMES § 6.12, at 514-17; PROSSER § 123, at 951; Bohlen, Incomplete
Privilege to Inflict Intentional Invasions of Property and Personality, 39 HARV. L. REV. 307,
314-24 (1926); Carpenter, supra note 79, at 745-46, 763.
$2 Mogul Steamship Co. v. McGregor, Gow & Co., 23 Q.B.D. 598, 618 (1889). See
HARPER & JAMES § 6.6, at 493; Comment, Inducing Breach of Contract: Herein of
Contracts Terminable at Will, 56 Nw. U.L. REv. 391-95 (1961); Note, Torts: Interference
with Contractual Relations: Limitations on the Lumley v. Gye Doctrine, 17 CORNELL L.
REV. 509 (1932); 40 COLUM. L. REV. 1094 (1940).
"E.g., Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co. v. Diamond State Fibre Co., 268 F. 121 (D. Del.
1920); Automobile Ins. Co. v. Guaranty Securities Corp., 240 F. 222 (S.D.N.Y. 1917);
Friedberg v. McClary, 173 Ky. 579, 191 S.W. 300 (1917); Knickerbocker Ice Co. v.
Gardiner Dairy Co., 107 Md. 559, 69 A. 405 (1908).
CONSUMER PRESSURE
probably should be considered superior to the interest of the
merchant, absent evidence of consumer malice or evidence that the
merchant represented a compelling interest beyond his own
economic self-interest. As in defamation, the burden of establishing
a privilege falls on the defendant,8 4 providing the necessary
procedural safeguard to justify application of the privilege in this
context.
A particularly compelling justification for the consumer's
actions can be asserted where the contract breached upon
inducement by the consumer was illegal or contrary to public
policy 8 5 Section 2-302 of the Uniform Commerical Code, which
permits a court to refuse to enforce any contract deemed to be
unconscionable, would appear to furnish strong support for denying
recovery where the contract interfered with falls within the scope of
that section. To do otherwise would be to give practical effect to a
contract deemed to be against public policy. Thus, where one
consumer induces another to break existing installment contracts
with an appliance dealer, the fact that those agreements were "open-
end" installment contracts"6 might privilege the interferor's actions
since such a contract has been held to be unconscionable.8 7
However, where the contract in question is not illegal or
unconscionable on its face, or has not been so held previously, the
interferor may be faced with an evidentiary problem if the
contracting consumer is not a party to the suit by the merchant.88
" HARPER & JAMES § 6.12, at 514; see Carpenter, supra note 79, at 745-62.
' See GREEN 878. But cf. Union Circulation Co. v. Hardel Publishers Serv. Inc., 6 Misc. 2d
340, 164 N.Y.S.2d 435 (Sup. Ct. 1957), in which the court stated that the fact that a
contract was voidable or unenforceable did not entitle a third party to induce its breach. 6
Misc.2d at 344, 164 N.Y.S.2d at 438; see PROSSER § 123, at 955-56. Nevertheless, the court in-
dicated that an induced breach of a void contract was not actionable, 6 Misc. 2d at 343, 164
N.Y.S.2d at 438, and hinted that if an unconscibnable clause rendered the entire contract void
no action could lie. Id. at 343-44, 164 N.Y.S.2d at 439.
An "open-end" installment contract is one in which final payment on any one item
purchased under such a contract cannot occur until installments due on all other items
similarly purchased are paid, title remaining in the seller until then. Thus, if the consumer
purchased a radio, a television set and a boat (either at one time or in sequence) under such
a contract, although the radio cost only twenty-five dollars, until the boat and television were
paid for the radio would not be credited in full even though more than twenty-five dollars
had been paid in installments up to that point. See Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture
Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965). In the Williams case the consumer-plaintiff was even
more at the mercy of the merchant since upon default of an installment the merchant could
repossess all the items.
11 Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965), noted in 51
CORNELL L.Q. 768 (1966); 54 GEO. L.J. 703 (1966); 79 HARv. L. REV. 1299 (1966).
ms Presumably, the contracting party could serve as witness for the defendant to introduce
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In view of the importance of the defendant's intent in a contract
interference suit, the victim of a hidden confessed judgment
contract, for example, could presumably urge others to refuse to
continue doing business with the merchant without danger of
liability if he did so out of an honest desire to advise the public,
rather than to damage the plaintiff.89 Moreover, additional
protection might be realized if the consumer clearly stated that he
was not urging his listeners or readers to break existing contracts
with the plaintiff but only to reconsider future business dealings.
Despite these general principles, however, it may be that a court
should not permit uncontrolled consumer action if the failure to
sustain an action for interference would restrict the freedom of speech
of the merchant or that of his customers. Such a situation might arise,
for example, where a consumer induces others to sever relations
with a publisher because of political disagreement with the ac-
tivities or sympathies of the publisher or some of his customers. It
is clear that allowance of a state cause of action may violate the
protections of the first amendment," but it does not necessarily
follow that the disallowance of a claim is subject to the same
constitutional infirmity." Instead of pursuing such a constitutional
argument, it is suggested that the better approach would be for the
court to recognize, in the process of the normal balancing technique
described above, 2 the importance of the merchant's free speech
rights and the consumer's attempted curtailment of those rights.
The preceding discussion also applies to the tort of interference
with prospective advantage, there being no valid action absent
intentional interference by the defendant or unless special
circumstances exist. 3 The only additional qualification is that the
the terms of the contract or to authenticate the written document, to the extent that a
variation exists from what the plaintiff asserted. See C. McCoR.MIcK. supra note 62, §§ 187-89.
"'See HARPER & JAMES § 6.11, at 513, § 6.12.
E.g., Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
"In Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945), it was stated:
Surely a command that the government itself shall not impede the free flow of ideas
does not afford non-governmental combinations a refuge if they impose restraints upon
that constitutionally guaranteed freedom .... Freedom to publish is guaranteed by the
Constitution, but freedom to combine to keep others from publishing is not.
In that case, however, the defendants in a Sherman Act prosecution were asserting the
first amendment as a defense, and the use of the Court's language to sustain an interference
action is questionable.
"See note 82 supra and accompanying text.
"E.g., Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821, cert. denied. 368
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aborted contractual expectancy must have had some degree of
certitude. 4 However, the certainty requirement would apparently
not be met where a consumer urged his neighbors to discontinue
purchasing their food from a particular merchant, except, perhaps,
if that grocer were the only one in the locale and the listeners
regularly did their shopping there. Even in the latter situation, the
consumer could probably escape liability if he were unaware of the
merchant's monopoly position since liability is not generally
premised on mere negligent conduct, but, like contractual
interference, is based on intentional or "malicious" behavior 5 In
fact, any purpose sufficient to create a privilege to interfere with
contractual relations, such as the protection of the interests of the
public,96 will also justify interference with relations which are
merely prospective 7 It is significant to note, moreover, that in an
action for interference with prospective advantage, truth has been
held to be a defense9
Injunctive Relief
Equity has historically refused to enjoin publication of a libel9
for two reasons: an injunction would ignore the defendant's right to
a jury trial, and it would serve as an unconstitutional prior
U.S. 987 (1962) (negligent drafting of will); Ward v. Arnold, 52 Wash. 2d 581, 328 P.2d 164
(1958) (liability may be predicated on simple negligence); see HARPER & JAMES § 6.11, at 51 I-
12; PROSSER § 124; note 78 supra.
11 HARPER& JAMES § 6.11, at512; PROSSER § 124, at974-75.
" HARPER& JAMES §§ 6.10-6.11.
" E.g., New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 303 U.S. 552 (1938) (action for
injunction); McCann v. New York Stock Exchange, 107 F.2d 908 (2d Cir. 1939), cert.
denied, 309 U.S. 684 (1940); Julie Baking Co. v. Graymond, 152 Misc. 846, 274 N.Y.S. 250
(Sup. Ct. 1934) (action for injunction); Chicago R.I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Armstrong, 30 Okla
134, 120 P. 952 (1911); Harris v. Thomas, 217 S.W. 1068 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920) (action for
injunction); see PROSSER § 124, at 978. Contra, NAACP v. Webb's City, 152 So. 2d 179
(Fla. App. 1963); A. S. Beck Shoe Corp. v. Johnson, 153 Misc. 363, 274 N.Y.S. 946 (Sup.
Ct. 1934); People v. Kopezak, 153 Misc. 187, 274 N.Y.S. 629 (Ct. Spec. Sess. 1934), affd,
266 N.Y. 565, 195 N.E. 202 (1935); (all actions for injunction).
PROSSER § 124, at 978-79.
McCann v. New York Stock Exchange, 107 F.2d 908 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 309 U.S.
684 (1940). Apparently erroneously, the decision was based upon the truth defense in a defama-
tion action, RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 606 (1938). See generally, 77 HARV. L. REV., supra note
65, at 960-61.
"See, e.g., Marlin Firearms Co. v. Shields, 171 N.Y. 384, 64 N.E. 163 (1902); GREEN 975-
78; Wolff, supra note 68, at 1305; 63 YALE L.J., supra note 26, at 96. Commentators have
been uniformly critical of the "rule." See, e.g., Pound, Equitable Relief Against Defamation
and Injuries to Personality, 29 HARV. L. REV. 640 (1916); 63 YALE L.J., supra, at 100-03.
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restraint on speech.1°0 The same rule applies to disparagement,
which is due in part to early judicial confusion mistaking
disparagement for defamation.10 Nevertheless, injunctions are
frequently issued when the courts find an illegal act or an "entire
course of conduct" against which equity may act, thus achieving
the same result through characterization of the conduct as action
rather than speech.02 Theoretically, before an injunction will lie the
petitioning party must establish that his remedy at law is
inadequate, alleging continuous publication or the threat of
renewal, insolvency, or unascertainable damages.103 In practice,
however, courts on occasion have required less.
Menard v. Houle' is one of the celebrated "lemon cases."
The defendant in that case had indicated his dissatisfaction with a
car purchased from plaintiff by motoring through the community
with a lemon and a sign attached to his car. The sign proclaimed
that the car was "no good," that the seller refused to repair it, and
that anyone who purchased the model was a "sucker." To publicize
his campaign further, this modern Don Quixote issued public
statements describing the car as a "lemon" and charging that the
plaintiff would not "make good." When the seller retaliated by
seeking an injunction, the defendant demurred on the grounds that
equity could not enjoin libel or slander. The Massachusetts
Supreme Court affirmed the denial of defendant's demurrer,
pointing to the "continuing course of unjustified and wrongful
attack upon the plaintiff motivated by actual malice."'0° The court
reasoned that it was enjoining wrongful "acts" rather than
wrongful speech and therefore found inapplicable the general equity
principle proscribing injunctive relief in defamation cases. It is
important to note that the court concluded in its statement of the
facts that the defendant knew his claims were false and that he
200 Marlin Firearms Co. v. Shields, 171 N.Y. 384, 64 N.E. 163 (1902); Pound, supra note
99, at 654-57; 63 YALE L.J., supra note 26, at 96.
102 63 YALE L.J., supra note 26, at 97. See note 65 supra and accompanying text,
"See, e.g., H.E. Allen Mfg. Co. v. Smith, 224 App. Div. 187, 229 N.Y.S. 692 (1928);
Saxon Motor Sales, Inc. v. Torino, 166 Misc. 863, 2 N.Y.S.2d 885 (Sup. Ct. 1938); Pound,
supra note 99, at 655; 63 YALE L.J., supra note 26, at 97-99. "[C]ourts have been able to
pledge allegiance to the rule and then avoid its effect." 77 HARv. L. REV., supra note 65, at
903.
I= 63 YALE L.J.. supra note 26, at 99.
"o 298 Mass. 546, II N.E.2d 436 (1937).
'11d. at 548, II N.E.2d at 437 (emphasis added).
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acted solely to injure and extort money from the plaintiff."0 6
Moreover, the cases cited as precedent by the court involved
situations in which the respective defendants were guilty of actual
malice.107 It is these often inarticulated elements of falsity and bad
faith which have created an inaccurate popular notion of the
"lemon" cases. Realistically, they do not strait-jacket a consumer
acting in good faith while attempting to publicize a valid claim.
McMorries v. Hudson Sales Corp.,108 for example, involved facts
virtually identical to those in Menard with one major difference:
there was no allegation that the public statements and writings of the
defendant were false or made with malicious intent. In denying that
an injunction could properly issue, the Texas Court of Civil
Appeals distinguished Menard on that basis." 9 Concluding that no
unlawful end was intended and that the actions were ends in
themselves, the court based its denial on the first amendment. This
view was carried even further by the same court in Lawrence v.
Atwood,"0 where the purchaser erected in his front yard a large
sign bearing a picture of a lemon. The sign equated the purchaser's
house with the lemon and identified the plaintiff as the contractor.
The contractor sought an injunction and damages for libel. The
appellate court held that an injunction had been improperly
granted by the trial court. Even though the defendant was charged
with intentionally, maliciously, and continually publishing a libel,
the court was impressed by the lack of any allegations of a
conspiracy, coercion, or intimidation. In the court's view
defamation alone did not confer equity jurisdiction."' No finding
was entered as to the truth of defendant's statements or the
existence of malice.
The disparagement-injunction cases follow a similar pattern. 2
"' See Singer v. Romerrick Realty Corp., 255 App. Div. 715, 5 N.Y.S.2d 607 (1938).
"' 298 Mass. at 548, I1 N.E.2d at 437.
233 S.W.2d 938 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950).
Id. at 941-42.
11 295 S.W.2d 298 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956); accord, Esskay Art Galleries v. Gibbs, 205 Ark.
1157, 172 S.W.2d 924 (1943).
"' 295 S.W.2d at 300.
lI Precedent for judicial willingness to grant an injunction where there is defamation or
disparagement- "plus" may lie in the analogous treatment given older patent infringement
cases by the courts. Pound, supra note 99, at 658-68; 75 U. PA. L. REv. 258 (1927). In
Boston Diatite Co. v. Florence Mfg. Co., 114 Mass. 69 (1873), an injunction against
defendant's charges of patent infringement by the plaintiff was refused because it was
Vol. 1969: 1011]
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Where there is malice or falsity, the courts are more willing to find
"libel plus" and grant an injunction. Thus, in H.E. Allen
Manufacturing Co. v. Smith' 3  the defendant printed several
spurious documents purporting to be official government papers,
and instructed salesmen to state falsely that plaintiff's competing
product was subject to seizure by the United States Government.
Noting that it was protecting the plaintiff's property interest in
good will, the court awarded general tort damages for the actual
loss suffered by the plaintiff and also deemed proper an injunction,
presumably because of the illegal printing which supplemented the
false accusations."' Similarly, in Saxon Motor Sales, Inc. v.
Torino,"5 the defendant was enjoined from placing derogatory signs
on a car purchased from the plaintiff. Noting the general
proscription against an injunction in such instances, the court felt
its action was justified due to the fact that the consumer's "sole
purpose" was to injure the plaintiff's business."' In the court's
view, the situation was analogous to interference with plaintiff's
business by physical obstruction. 7 No finding was made as to
whether the derogatory comments were accurate.
As the defamation and disparagement cases suggest,
cantankerous consumers cannot safely assume that an injunction
will never issue should they undertake to dramatize their objections
believed that no property right was involved and that equity was without jurisdiction,
Accord, Baltimore Car-Wheel Co. v. Bemis, 29 F. 95 (C.C.D. Mass. 1886); Kidd v. Horry,
28 F. 773 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1886). However, in Emack v. Kane, 34 F. 46 (C.C.N.D. Ill,
1888), the defendant was successfully enjoined because the infringement allegation was
utilized as a form of intimidation, indicating that courts were free to discover equity
jurisdiction where an improper purpose predominated. See Electric Renovating Co. v.
Vacuum Co., 189 F. 754 (C.C.W.D. Pa. 1911); Adriance v. National Harrow Co., 121 F.
827 (2d Cir. 1903). But see Warren v. Landauer, 151 F. 130 (C.C.E.D. Wis. 1907) (no bad
faith shown); Kelly v. Yipsilanti Dress-Stay Co., 44 F. 19 (C.C.E.D. Mich. 1890) (purpose
of communication was to prevent future law suits); 75 U. PA. L. REv. 258, 261 (1927)
(without finding of falsity or bad faith granting of injunction created too chilling an effect on
first amendment rights).
"' 224 App. Div. 187, 229 N.Y.S. 692 (1928). The court treated the complaint as an
action for libel, but it more properly presented a question of disparagement.
" The opinion is abbreviated and fails to articulate the court's reason for ignoring the
general rule against the granting of an injunction in a defamation or disparagement action.
1 166 Misc. 863, 2 N.Y.S.2d 885 (Sup. Ct. 1938).
" lid. at 863, 2 N.Y.S.2d at 885; accord, Carter v. Knapp Motor Co., 243 Ala. 600, II
So. 2d 383 (1943) (defendant's motive was to compel plaintiff to give him another car);
Sherry v. Perkins, 147 Mass. 212, 17 N.E. 307 (1888) (entire scheme was to intimidate
workmen).
11 166 Misc. at 863, 2 N.Y.S.2d at 885.
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through "demonstrative evidence." Although it is hard to imagine
a modern court enjoining a solitary consumer from driving with a
sign and a lemon on his car, particularly where there is a vast
disparity in market power between the car dealer and the consumer,
commentators have uniformly criticized the no-injunction rule"l8
and previous courts have been willing to find and enjoin wrongful
"acts" used in conjunction with defamatory speech. Nevertheless,
the likelihood of even "speech plus" being enjoined by a
contemporary tribunal, especially where the statement is true or
uttered in good faith for a nondestructive purpose, is minimal."'
Indeed, in the absence of malice or falsity, precedent would not
sanction injunctive relief in defamation or disparagement actions.
Moreover, the protesting consumer is benefitted by the' merchant's
fear of creating an adverse public reaction and of further
publicizing the consumer's derogatory allegations by seeking to
enjoin the consumer's antics. Barring unusual circumstances, such
as substantial market power in the consumer or highly defamatory
remarks, the merchant's appropriate response would thus seem to
be either to ignore the good faith consumer or to attempt to
mollify him.
Injunctions have also been issued in contract interference cases,
but these have involved special circumstances. In Pratt Food Co. v.
Bird,'-21 for example, the petitioner sought to restrain a state food
commissioner from warning the public not to purchase the
merchant's product. In affirming the denial of an injunction, the
Michigan Supreme Court stated that an injunction might properly
lie had there been a combination attempting to ruin the petitioner's
business by intimidation or coercion, or had the food commissioner
acted beyond his authority or without probable cause, but one
would not lie under the facts before the court. Apparently, the good
faith of the food commissioner and the veracity of his accusations
"' See note 96 supra. --in substance the traditional doctrine puts anyone's business at the
mercy of any insolvent malicious defamer who has sufficient imagination to lay out a skillful
campaign of extortion." Pound, supra note 99, at 668. England has now adopted a contrary
approach. 63 YALE L.J., supra note 26, at 97 n.189.
"' See 77 HARV. L. REV.. supra note 65, at 904. "Constitutional protection quite possibly
should be given to the noncompetitive, individual disparager who paints signs on his car
purely out of spite or protest, seeks no economic gain from his disparagement, and perhaps
stands as close to the political commentator as to the disparaging competitor." Id.
12* 148 Mich. 631, 112 N.W. 701 (1907).
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were significant factors. More troublesome for the consumer, how-
ever, are cases such ap American Mercury, Inc. v. Chase,' where an
injunction was issued against members of a society which had
threatened criminal prosecution of several publishers if the latter
sold or distributed publications deemed obscene by members of the
society. The court condemnea the members' use of coercion, stating
that the lack of a commercial motive did not justify their actions.,"2
The case is probably exceptional, however, due to the threat of
criminal prosecution'23 and the intricate involvement of the
publisher's first amendment freedom. 24
Where an injunction against derogatory comment is sought by a
merchant who is attempting to enforce an unconscionable contract,
or who has sold defective goods, the consumer might persuade the
court to refuse the petition under the general equitable principle of
"unclean hands.' '2  Certainly, a court faced with the question
should attempt to discern the veracity and purpose of the
defendant's comments before issuing an injunction, unless
circumstances such as the merchant's impending ruin demonstrate
the desirability of an immediate temporary injunctionY.2 1
In summary, it would appear that consumers acting in good
faith and not out of vengeance or a desire to ruin the merchant
need not fear an action for defamation, disparagement, or
contractual interference if they make truthful statements, or ones
honestly believed and based on reasonable inferences, and utilize
reasonable publication methods. For this reason, consumers should
restrict themselves to an objective statement of the facts, avoiding
the use of broad, inflammatory language. 'Nor is it likely that an
injunction will issue if consumers employ reasonable demonstrative
techniques for nondestructive purposes. Under existing law the
characterization of "speech plus" can be avoided if malice and
falsity are not present.
However, on the surface, this carefully worded counsel would
appear unduly restrictive and could be interpreted as saying that if
12 13 F.2d 224 (D.C. Mass. 1926), noted in .75 U. PA. L. REv. 258 (1927).
2 13 F.2d at 225.
11 But cf 75 U. PA. L. REV. 258, 260-61 (1927). See discussion of blackmail in text
accompanying notes 216-19 infra.
" See notes 90-92 supra and accompanying text.
115 But see note 85 supra.
"' Cf. 75 U. PA. L. REV. 258, 261 (1927).
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the methods will prove effective they should not be employed. In-
deed, in light of the paucity of modern consumer-merchant cases,
due in part to the natural hesitancy on the part of merchants to
initiate image-damaging lawsuits and the long-standing reluctance
of consumers to adopt a combatant posture, it probably is overly
cautious. Nevertheless, existing law presents a sufficiently flexible
and predictable pattern so that an aroused consumer, armed with a
legitimate grievance, may effectively dramatize his plight by exerting
a degree of pressure compatible with a free society.
PICKETING AND BOYCOTTS
Although well-planned and controlled publication efforts may be
both productive and relatively free of legal repercussions, direct action
which exerts greater psychological and economic pressure on the
merchant is likely to be more effective in securing remedial measures
and in discouraging repetition of objectionable practices. For this
reason, consumers should also consider the use of individual and joint
picketing,12 group boycotts,12 lobbying, and threats of legal action.
As in the situation of the older legal remedies, there are very few
recent cases involving direct non-legal confrontations between
consumers and merchants which require courts to balance the
competing interests in a modern commercial framework. Any
conclusions drawn, therefore, are necessarily tentative. Nevertheless,
present consumer reticence to exert direct pressure on unethical
merchants would appear to be needlessly circumspect.'29
I In the spring of 1967, American housewives picketed supermarkets across the country,
protesting high food prices. Though the campaign was short-lived and largely unsuccessful it
was not without effect. "[T]he protests were a catalyst to an already growing business
awareness of consumer dissatisfaction ..... E. PETERSON4, REPORT OF PRESIDENT'S
COMMITTEE ON CONSUMER INTERESTS 5 (1967).
1 This comment makes no attempt to discuss the question of secondary boycotts, which
courts generally have been quick to enjoin. Analogizing from labor cases, picketing of a
supplier or distributor would be enjoined if it conveyed a plea to boycott the entire line of
either. For this reason there must be a "product" which is being boycotted-a good or
service. Uncertainty arises, however, if the supplier or distributor deals in one or a very few
products. See Comment, Secondary Consumer Picketing- The Product Boycott, 19 Sw. L.J.
567, 575-78, 586-88 (1965).
22- The paucity of modern consumer-merchant cases (see text accompanying notes 83 and
224, following note 173, and immediately preceding discussion of Picketing and Boycotts) is
not the only barometer of consumer reluctance to exert direct pressure on a merchant.
Replies to a questionnaire sent to consumer organizations throughout the country suggest a
common apprehension of the legal consequences arising from a direct confrontation with
unethical merchants. To be sure, almost all of the respondent organizations considered
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Injunctive Relief
As indicated earlier, equity is not adverse to acting where there
is evidence of "speech plus."'130 Despite Supreme Court authority
that industrial picketing ' is constitutionally protected"' l  and
congressional enactments sanctioning organized employee pressure,'
labor picketing is not per se free speech. 3  Adopting a rationale
comparable to that used in granting injunctive relief in defamation
and disparagement cases,' 34  courts have traditionally enjoined
employee picketing whenever an illegal purpose or means could be
detected.35 An identical approach has been employed to enjoin
themselves more in the nature of educational or lobbying bodies than of pressure groups.
Nevertheless, their responses conveyed an exaggerated fear of legal retaliation and
uncertainty both as to their legal rights and as to effective means of direct action. Typical of
the responses was one received from the Consumers' Cooperative Society located in Palo
Alto, California: "I would say that consumers probably are inhibited in taking action
because they do not know how to do it effectively. They don't know to whom to send the
complaint, and they don't know what their legal rights are to apply pressure, or even to
publicize comments critical of a specific, named business." Letter from Emil Sekerak to the
Duke Law Journal, Dec. 10, 1968. The organizations were in general agreement that
consumers should be permitted under the law to picket and boycott questionable merchants,
and the one organization which had tried such methods stated that such tactics were the
most effective means of "spot-lighting" merchant devices. Letter from Mrs. Faith Prior,
Consumer Information Clearinghouse, University of Vermont, Burlington, Vermont, to the
Duke Law Journal, Nov. 19, 1968. Unfortunately, the small number of responses received
(eight replies to twenty-six inquiries) and the incomplete nature of some of the answers given
precluded any meaningful statistical analysis of the activities, procedures, or philosophy of
consumer organizations. Judging from the volume of printed matter forwarded with the
replies, however, such organizations (whose names were obtained from CONSUMERS UNION
OF THE UNITED STATES, CONSUMER PROTECTION (1966)), apparently concentrate most of
their efforts on newsletters to members and informational and propaganda pamphlets.
0 See notes 99-126 supra and accompanying text.
' Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 103-04 (1940). cj. Carpenters Local 213 v. Ritter's
Cafe, 315 U.S. 722, 729-32 (1942) (Black, J., dissenting).
"I See National Labor Relations Act § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 147 (1964).
'3 See, e.g., Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plazit, Inc., 391 U.S. 308, 326
(1968) (Douglas, J., concurring) ("Picketing is free speech plus, the plus being physical activity
that may implicate traffic and related matters. Hence the latter aspects may be regulated.")
Building Service Local 262 v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532, 537 (1950); Bakery Drivers Local 802 v.
Wohl, 315 U.S. 769, 775 (1942) (dicta). See also Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S.
498 (1959); 19 Sw. L.J., supra note 128, at 580.
131 See Julie Baking Co. v. Graymond, 152 Misc. 846, 274 N.Y.S. 250 (Sup. Ct. 1934). "1
conceive that it is clear in reason and principle that picketing not accompanied 'by violence,
threats or intimidation express or implied,' and having a lawful purpose, should not be
enjoined." Id. at 847, 274 N.Y.S. at 251 (emphasis added). See generally notes 99-126 supra
and accompanying text.
"'See, e.g., McMichael v. Atlanta Envelope Co., 151 Ga. 776, 108 S.E. 226 (1921)
(physical coercion); Beck v. Railway Union, 118 Mich. 497, 77 N.W. 13 (1898) (intimidation
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consumer picketing.'3  Similarly, whereas older opinions in labor
cases often characterized primary boycotts as "conspiracies" and
therefore wrongful, 137  modern courts search for extenuating
circumstances such as intimidation or malice before enjoining labor
or consumer boycotts. 13 Thus, if they elect peacefully and
reasonably' 39 to picket and boycott a department store assessing
hidden and exhorbitant interest charges, consumers would appear
to be insulated from injunctive interference, except to the extent
that an unsympathetic court is able to discover an "illegal"
purpose or evidence of intimidation. In short, it is the latitude of
judicial discretion in these cases which may render group boycotts
and picketing the most vulnerable of the various consumer tactics
to legal retaliation.4 '
Nevertheless, an analysis of recent cases in analogous areas and
an evaluation of the policies served by consumer pressure suggest
that the broad discretion given the judiciary in picketing and
boycott cases does not cripple the consumer. Indeed, an unfettered
judiciary may be an advantage to the consumer, for where a court
is required to exercise its discretion on a case-by-case basis,
predecent carries limited weight. Presumably, therefore, con-
sumers exerting pressure in a nonviolent fashion need only per-
suade the court of the legitimacy of their purpose in order to
withstand a petition for equitable relief. Initially, it is significant
that the judiciary's traditional hostility toward organized labor has
and falsity); Nann v. Raimist, 255 N.Y. 307, 174 N.E. 690 (1931) (physical coercion and
intimidation).
"' See, e.g., Green v. Samuelson, 168 Md. 421, 178 A. 109 (1935); A.S. Beck Shoe Corp.
v. Johnson, 153 Misc. 363, 274 N.Y.S. 946 (Sup. Ct. 1934).
"I See F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION 2-5 (1930).
" See, e.g., Vincent v. Operating Engineers Local 106, 207 F. Supp. 414 (N.D.N.Y.
1962); Steiner v. Local 128, Oil Workers, 19 Cal. 2d 676, 123 P.2d 20 (1942); NAACP v.
Overstreet, 221 Ga. 16, 142 S.E.2d 816 (1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 118 (1966). But cf.
NAACP v. Webb's City, Inc., 152 So. 2d 179 (Fla. Ct. App. 1963).
3 Blocking the entrance to the merchant's place of business is probably unreasonable
picketing. See, e.g., Smith v. Grady, 411 F.2d 181 (5th Cir. 1969); Julie Baking Co. v.
Graymond, 152 Misc. 846, 274 N.Y.S. 250 (Sup. Ct. 1934).
"I A good example of the danger to a consumer posed by an unsympathetic court in light
of the judiciary's virtually unbridled discretion in picketing and boycott cases is NAACP v.
Webb's City, Inc., 152 So. 2d 179 (Fla. Ct. App. 1963). In that case the appellate court was
able to affirm an injunction against picketing and a boycott by members of a racial minority
against a merchant by labeling the actions "coercive picketing," and holding that the
merchant's interest in commercial expectancies outweighed the defendants' social objectives.
Id. at 183.
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softened. 4' Courts have gradually permitted labor unions greater
latitude of action before classifying their ends or means as illegal,
perhaps in part because unions have diminished their reliance on
physical coercion." For example, in Nann v. Raimist the court
enjoined a union's picketing because of the use of violence, but did
so in language which stressed the union's basic right to use
demonstrative speech. The court stated that "if the defendant
believes in good faith that the policy pursued by the plaintiff is
hostile to the interests of organized labor . ..it has the privilege
by the pressure of notoriety and persuasion to bring its own policy
to triumph." '44 Apparently, this liberalization is not only in
response to federal labor legislation outlining employee rights,' but
also reflects an appreciation of both the first amendment issue
involved and labor's need to organize in order to reduce the
economic disparity between employer and employee.'40 Freedom of
speech and economic inequality are also involved in consumer
picketing and it is as likely, if not more likely,4 ' that courts will
adopt a similar stance toward consumer pressure.
Similar considerations were present in cases involving Negro
boycotts.'48 *In two cases arising in 1934,11 which were novel at *that
time, Negroes picketing to obtain a higher percentage of Negro
... Compare Teamsters Local 695 v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284 (1957) and Vegelahn v.
Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 44 N.E. 1077 (1896) with Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan
Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
"I Compare Central Metal Products Corp. v. O'Brien, 278 F. 827 (6th Cir. 1922);
McMichael v. Atlanta Envelope Co., 151 Ga. 776, 108 S.E. 226 (1921) and Sherry v.
Perkins, 147 Mass. 212, 17 N.E. 307 (1888) with Lesse v. Cooks, Waiters & Waitresses
Local 31, 2 Cal. 2d 312, 41 P.2d 314 (1935).
" 255 N.Y. 307, 174 N.E. 690 (1931).
'"Id. at 314, 174 N.E. at 693.
m See National Labor Relations Act §§ 7-8, 29 U.S.C. §§ 157-58 (1964).
"See.Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968). "We
start from the premise that peaceful picketing carried on in a location open generally to the
public is, absent other factors involving the purpose or manner of the picketing, protected by
the First Amendment." Id. at 313.
" As a practical matter, judges are likely to be quicker to embrace consumer pressure to
remove reprehensible market tactics than they were to accept union activities simply because
they can more readily identify with the wronged consumer than they can with the striking
employee. Cf Cahn, Law in the Consumer Perspective, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 17-20 (1968).
,!8 See Coons, Non-Commercial Purpose as a Sherman Act Defense, 56 Nw. U.L, REV.
705, 721-23 (1962).
"'Green v. Samuelson, 168 Md. 421, 178 A. 109 (1935); A.S. Beck Shoe Corp. v.
Johnson, 153 Misc. 363, 274 N.Y.S. 946 (Sup. Ct. 1934).
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employment were enjoined, in one case-due to the improper means
employed' and in the other because the avowed purpose did not
justify the means.'5' Both courts classified the dispute as "racial,"
denying that the rules applicable to a labor dispute were relevant.15 2
However, in New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co.,153 the
United States Supreme Court disavowed separate treatment for
racial picketing, at least in an employment context, holding that
the anti-injunction provision of the Norris-La Guardia Act"54
embraces more than disputes between trade associations and
employers.'55 The Court's decision to treat racial disputes in the
same manner as labor disputes, while suggesting that picketing for
racial and economic equality is generally a "legal" purpose, still
permits the courts to enjoin such actions where a wrongful specific
purpose or an improper means is discovered. 56 Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court's recognition of the historic economic inferiority of
blacks in this country' 57 and their correlative need to organize in
order to educate the public and improve their standing' 8 would
seem to require courts to balance the needs of blacks against the
community's interest in order. 5' This view has'been endorsed by
Chief Justice Traynor of California, 6" who argued that in the
absence of a statute protecting Negroes from discrimination, it was
not unreasonable for them to seek equality through economic
power, and-that the "peaceful mobilization of a group's economic
power" should not be enjoined. 6' As he stated, "[i]f picketing does
"I Green v. Samuelson, 168 Md. 421,178 A.. 109 (1935).
Mt A.S. Beck Shoe Corp. v. Johnson, 153 Misc. 363, 274 N.Y.S. 946 (Sup. Ct. 1934); 35
COLUI. L. REV. 121 (1935); 48 HARV. L. REV. 691 (1935); 83 U. PA. L. REV. 383 (1935).
152 Green v. Samuelson, 168 Md. 421, 429, 178 A. 109, 112-13 (1935); A.S. Beck Shoe
Corp. v. Johnson, 153 Misc. 363, 368-69, 274 N.Y.S. 946, 952-53 (Sup. Ct. 1934).
" 303 U.S. 552 (1938).
" Norris-LaGuardia Act §§ 1, 13, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101, 113 (1964).
MI 303 U.S. at 560-61.
'- See, e.g., Hughes v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. 2d 850, 198 P.2d 885 (1948); NAACP v.
Overstreet, 221 Ga. 16, 142 S.E.2d 816 (1965).
"17E.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
"' See, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429 (1962); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S.
449, 462-63 (1958).
I" See, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429-31, 439 (1962); NAACP v. Alabama,
357 U.S. 449, 462-63 (1958).
Hughes v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. 2d 850, 198 P.2d 885 (1948).
Iat d. at 868, 198 P.2d at 896 (Traynor, J., dissenting). See Duplex Printing Press
Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 488 (1921) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Hughes v. Superior
Court, 32 Cal. 2d 850, 897, 198 P.2d 885, 894-95 (Carter, J., dissenting).
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not contain substantial nonspeech elements and is primarily con-
ducted to disseminate information, limitations that differentiate
picketing from other forms of speech should not be invoked. ' 6 2
Moreover, recent court of appeals decisions indicate that organized
Negro boycotts and related picketing of white merchants for the
purpose of inducing nondiscriminatory hiring practices will be fully
protected under the first amendment, so long as violence, threatened
violence, or interference with traffic does not occur. " ' While the
importance of the racial discrimination factor in these latter cases
cannot be exaggerated, it seems clear that the blacks' need to
enlist public support in their effort to minimize their economic
inferiority was the central factor in those decisions. "4 These
considerations involving first amendment rights and economic
disparity-also operate in labor disputes and consumer protests, and
a balancing technique would seem to be equally applicable in those
instances. 6 '
At the very least, New Negro Alliance and the recent labor and
civil rights cases would seemingly preclude the labeling of consumer
picketing as illegal per se and the characterization of economic self-
interest as an improper purpose. In addition, these cases suggest
that the merchant-consumer "economic" gap is relevant to any
finding of wrongful means, 6' and that a balancing of the interests
of the merchant, the consumer and society in general is
appropriate.' In justifying the reasonable use of group pressure,
"1 32 Cal. 2d at 871, 198 P.2d at 897 (Traynor, J., dissenting).
'6 Machesky v. Bizzell, 414 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1969); Smith v. Grady, 411 F.2d 181 (5th Cir.
1969).
'' See 32 Cal. 2d at 868, 198 P.2d at 896 (Traynor, J., dissenting).
'The Supreme Court has indirectly acknowledged the significant and valid role which
concerned consumers can play by coupling them with striking union workers and protesting
minority groups and assuming that such groups have the right and the legitimate need to
picket to dramatize their respective plights. "These figures [of the notable increase in the
number of shopping centers in the United States] illustrate the substantial consequences for
workers seeking to challenge substandard working conditions, consumers protesting shoddy
or overpriced merchandise, and minority groups seeking nondiscriminatory hiring policies
that a [decision enjoining picketing in a shopping center on the basis of property rights
would have]." Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308, 324
(1968). See note 16 supra.
' This argument loses its appeal, of course, when the economic disparity is reversed, as
where the defendant is wealthy and the merchant is insolvent. For this reason a continuously
operating, self-sustaining body of consumers conducting a boycott might be more susceptible
to an injunction than would a spontaneous organization of limited life.
167 See NAACP v. Webb's City, Inc., 152 So. 2d 179 (Fla. Ct. App. 1963).
I
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these cases have emphasized that the first amendment rights
of the protestors are not to be ignored. 6 Freedom of speech
in a commercial context arguably safeguards not only the
public's interest in being apprised of unacceptable business
practices and in the removing of such practices from the
marketplace, but in theory at least, it also aids competition by
fostering the exchange of free and accurate information.'69 By
focusing attention on a reprehensible market tactic and
emphasizing their role as one of public service,170 consumers have
ample ammunition to convince a court of the legitimacy of their
purpose.
Antitrust Suits
Popular notions notwithstanding, economic restraints imposed
by a non-competitor are not immune from the federal antitrust
laws'7' and the use of pickets or boycotts may well precipitate a
private antitrust suit. 72 In addition, a state or national consumer
organization could conceivably be confronted by a government
antitrust action if, for example, a widespread campaign against
automobile manufacturers posed a substantial threat to interstate
commerce and the nation's economy. As is true of injunctions,
however, in the absence of extenuating circumstances courts today
are not likely to curtail the activities of consumers acting in good
I" Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308, 313-15; Machesky
v. Bizzell. 414 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1969); Smith v. Grady, 411 F.2d 181 (5th Cir. 1969);
Nann v. Raimist, 255 N.Y. 307, 317-19, 174 N.E. 690, 694-95 (1931). See also Bakery
Drivers Local 802 v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769 (1942); NAACP v. Overstreet, 221 Ga. 16, 142
S.E.2d 816 (1965).
"' Cy. Millstein, supra note 14, at 462-65, 492. But cJ. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S.
52, 54 (1942); Developments in the Law-Deceptive Advertising, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1005,
1027-38 (1967). "'[T]he Constitution imposes no . . . restraint on government as respects
purely commercial advertising." Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942).
I" See Rosman v. Strictly Kosher Butchers Union, 164 Misc. 378, 298 N.Y.S. 343 (Sup.
Ct. 1937). But cf. People v. Kopezak, 153 Misc. 187, 274 N.Y.S. 629 (Ct. Spec. Sess. 1934)
(picketing of landlord by tenants not proper where complaint should have been iled with
municipal authority).
I See Coons. supra note 148, at 754-55; Marcus, Civil Rights and the Anti-trust Law, 18
U. Cmn, L. REV. 171, 174 (1951).
I 7 See Marcus, supra note 171, at 174; Comment, Concerted Refisals to Deal wvith .%'on-
business Consumers Under the Sherman Act, 41 TE.aip. L.Q. 311 (1968).
This comment does not consider the impact of state antitrust legislation other than in
notes 176 and 214 hijra and accompanying text.
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faith and in the public interest,7 3 primarily because of deference to
the first amendment.' Unfortunately, as in other areas, there are few
modern cases upon which to rely.
Individual refusals to deal generally are not proscribed by the
antitrust laws, 75 and there would appear to be no apparent
danger for the individual boycotter. Concerted refusals to deal, on
the other hand, are per se violations of the Sherman Act when
employed in a business context.'76 Indeed, it has been suggested that
at least as to refusals to sell, only an ineffective boycott- "devoid
of intent to injure, of coercive practices, and of dominant
marketing position"-will be upheld. 77 Nevertheless, several writers
have suggested that a "non-commercial" or "non-economic"
purpose ought to be a defense to a Sherman Act prosecution, '7  and
would include consumer boycotts, civil rights boycotts and obscene
literature boycotts within the "non-commercial" category.' 71 A
" 77 HARV. L. REV., supra note 65, at 931-32. "A strong presumption in favor of the
legality of consumer boycotts seems justified because they are directed at the original source
of consumer displeasure. Such a boycott pits the determination of the plaintiff to continue
the activity which has displeased the consumers against the intensity and extent of consumer
feeling." Id. at 932.
171 See notes 22, 60 & 168 supra. A problem created by group rather than individual pressure
is that every member of a picketing "team" may not be motivated by the same goal, thus
increasing the chances of a court ascertaining an illegitimate purpose and enjoining further
activities on that basis. Coons, supra note 148, at 709.
175 See, e.g., United States v. Colgate, 250 U.S. 300 (1919). But see Albrecht v. Herald
Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968); United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966);
United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960).
The only conceivable exception to this principle would be a consumer who, because of his
wealth or position, possessed substantial market power and was utilizing that power to
monopolize a market. See REPORT OF THE ATORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMIIrEE TO
STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS 134, 136-37 (1955); Fulda, Individual Refusals to Deal: When
Does Single-firm Conduct Become Vertical Restraint? 30 LAW & CONTEMP. PROD. 590, 604-
05 (1965). It is difficult to imagine a retail consumer who could hold such power, however.
'See, e.g., Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (19591; Fashion
Originators' Guild of America, Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941); Eastern States Retail
Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600 (1914). See also S. OPPENHEIM & G.
WESTON, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS 533 (3d ed. 1968) [hereinafter cited as OPPENHEIM &
WESTON]. But see Rahl, Per Se Rules and Boycotts Under the Sherman Act: Some
Reflections on the KIor's Case, 45 VA. L. REV. 1165, 1172-73 (1959) (rule of reason).
State antitrust legislation has been interpreted in the same manner. See, e.g., Alexander's
Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Ohrbach's, Inc., 269 App. Div. 321, 56 N.Y.S.2d 173 (1945).
17, Note, Refusals to Sell and Public Control of Competition, 58 YALE L.J. 1121, 1140
(1949).
'78 OPPENHEIM & WESTON 530-31; Coons, supra note 148. But see Marcus, supra note 171,
at 174.
'' A "'commercial" purpose is defined as one which is profit-inspired, while an
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consumer boycott could apparently be "non-economic" also, as
where public service is the primary motivation.1 0
Although precedent is minimal, it does lend support to the non-
commercial exception postulated above. Nonprofit trade
associations have been permitted to collect and disseminate
statistics among members, excluding in the process non-members
and "offenders," even though those excluded were also engaged in
the common trade.18 1 Industry efforts to eliminate deceptive
advertising or fraudulent business practices have been recognized as
an important aid to governmental regulation,' so long as the
industry does not progress beyond exhortation and impose codes of
ethics enforced by sanctioris.'8 Such an approach necessitates the
court's taking cognizance of the group's motivation. Finally, the
accepted "representative government" doctrine established by the
United States Supreme Court in Eastern Railroad Presidents Con-
ference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.'84 not only indicates that con-
sumers may freely unite in lobbying efforts without fear of antitrust
prosecution but also lends credence to attempts to carve out of the
"economic" purpose reflects material self-interest not including the profit motive. Coons,
supra note 148, at 712-13. Thus, a consumer who acts to recover money paid for defective
goods would have an economic purpose but not a commercial purpose, and one who seeks
only to educate the public to the danger posed by the merchant's practices would have
neither an economic nor a commercial purpose.
' It is interesting to note that one is justified in refusing to deal with a false advertiser in
a business context. OPPENHEIM & WESTON 507.
"I See Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563 (1925). But
see United States v. Container Corp., 393 U.S. 333 (1969) (voluntary exchange of price
information without agreement to adhere held to be Sherman Act violation). See also Sugar
Institute, Inc. v. United States, 297 U.S. 553 (1936).
" See Cement Mfg. Protective Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 588, 604 (1925); Hughes
Tool Co. v. Motion Picture Ass'n, Inc., 66 F. Supp. 1006 (S.D.N.Y. 1946); cf. Sugar
Institute, Inc. v. United States, 297 U.S. 553 (1936); Deesen v. Professional Golfers Ass'n,
358 F.2d 165 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 846 (1966).
'See Fashion Originators' Guild of America, Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941); cf.
United States v. Insurance Bd., 188 F. Supp. 949 (N.D. Ohio 1960).
1- 365 U.S. 127 (1961) (holding that joint lobbying by members of an industry did not
violate the antitrust laws, despite the use of deception, since those laws are directed at trade
restraints, not at political activity designed to influence governmental action). The decision
has been followed and arguably extended, in several decisions, e.g., United Mine Workers v.
Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); George Benz& Sons v.Twin City Milk Producers Ass'n., Inc.,
1969 Trade Cas. 87,445 (D. Minn. 1969); Trucking, Unlimited v. California Motor Transp.
Co., 1967 Trade Cas. 84,739 (N.D. Cal. 1967), appeal docketed, No. 22,462 (9th Cir. Dec.
21, 1967), notedin 57 CALIF. L. REV. 518 (1969).
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antitrust laws a special exception for groups motivated by factors
other than a desire to maximize profits.'8
The primary exponent of this "non-commercial" group action
exception has been Professor Coons,' who, analyzing common law
treatment of restraints of trade, asserts that the purpose of the
restraining party has been one of the factors evaluated by the
courts. Indeed, a lawful purpose sometimes justified a prima facie
tort.'87 Summarizing cases involving privileged relationships, such
as those concerned with disciplinary actions by religious groups and
school authorities, Coons maintains that, assuming the existence of
the requisite relationship, a reasonable purpose in conjunction with
reasonable means allowed invocation of the relevant privilege.' He
concludes that the common law has accepted the defendants'
purpose-whether commercial, economic or non-economic-as an
important factor in determining whether they were justified in
restraining trade.189 Turning to antitrust litigation, Professor Coons
finds significance in the special privilege accorded lobbying groups
by the Noerr Motor decision' " and that given labor unions by
modern courts, and he emphasizes that the courts employ a
balancing technique out of regard for the unions' "non-
commercial" motivation.'9' Acknowledging that the few Sherman
Act cases involving defendants with a non-commercial purpose
have not conferred immunity on such parties, he nevertheless
suggests that purpose is a valid segment of the "rule of reason"'8 "
and that a "benevolent, non-economic purpose" may justify a
reasonable restraint.13 In Coons' view, antitrust liability should
115See Handler, Recent .Antitrust Developments. 71 YALE L.J. 75 (1961). Walden, More
About Noerr-Lobbying, Antitrust and the Right to Petition, 14 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 1211
(1967). "'Presumably, a 'vicious' campaign to injure competition is beyond the reach of
antitrust if it is executed by constitutionally guaranteed means, provided the Court is
convinced on the facts of the particular case that the uninhibited exercise of the
constitutional freedom is more important to society than the protection of industry from
such destructive conduct." Handler, supra at 89-90.
Coons. supra note 148.
I Id. ai 713-15.
Id. at 716-21.
id. at 725.
I90 d. at 749-5 i, 754.
' Id. at 731-42, 752-53.
"- See United States v. Standard Oil, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
' Coons, supra note 148, at 749-51. But see Comment, "'Political" Blacklisting it the
Motion Picture Industry: A Sherman Act Violation, 74 YAL.E L.J. 567 (1965) (political
blacklisting by producers not justified on social, moral, or political grounds).
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depend upon a balancing of the effects of defendants' anti-
competitive activities with the policy goals, other than free
competition, which are furthered by the purpose being pursued. 9"
The few antitrust cases involving non-commercial purposes offer
little guidance in assessing the validity of Coons' thesis. In fact,
they even confirm that a "non-commercial" purpose will not
automatically immunize a concerted refusal to deal. In Council
of Defense v. International Magazine Co., 1 5 the Council, a state
body created to cooperate with the National Council of Defense,
boycotted plaintiff's magazines as being "un-American" and exerted
"patriotic coercion" on newsmen and readers, with the avowed inten-
tion of destroying plaintiff's business in New Mexico. An injunction
was granted since the acts amounted to a "conspiracy to boycott."'96
In Bratcher v. Akron Area Board of Realtors,'9 7 the defendant-
"' Coons, supra note 148, at 747.
' 267 F. 390 (8th Cir. 1920).
' Id. at 412. Paramount Pictures, Inc. v. United Motion Picture Theatre Owners, 93
F.2d 714 (3d Cir. 1937), argues against a consumer exception to the federal antitrust laws,
although the case arose in a business context. In granting an injunction against movie theater
owners for boycotting movie distributors in order to obtain better prices, the Third Circuit
stated: "Congress intended by the anti-trust acts to prevent all combinations and
conspiracies, whether composed of employees, employers, producers, users, or consumers,
from unreasonably restraining the free flow of interstate commerce." Id. at 719 (emphasis
added). But see Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 493 (1940): "The end sought [in
passing the Sherman Act] was the prevention of restraints to free competition in business
and conmtercial transactions which tended to restrict production, raise prices or otherwise
control the market to the detriment of purchasers or consumers of goods and services, all of
which had come to be regarded as a special form of public injury." Id. at 493 (emphasis
added). See note 201 infra and accompanying text. If Apex Hosiery is correct in its
statement of the congressional purpose intended in the passage of the Sherman Act, it would
seem anomalous that consumers should be threatened by a statute passed for their market
protection. At any rate, the broad language used in Paramount Pictures is certainly not
accurate today since unions and agricultural workers are virtually exempt from the antitrust
laws. See L.P.C. Distributors, Inc. v. Moving Picture Operators Local 110, 132 F. Supp.
294, 299 (N.D. I1I. 1955) (union exempt if acting in its self-interest and in pursuit of
legitimate objectives); REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO
STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS 294 (1955) (union activity exempt unless designed to fix prices,
kinds or amount of products). Moreover, there is evidence that professional societies such as
the American Medical Association and the American Bar Association may be afforded
specialized treatment under the antitrust laws due to special features such as close state
supervision. See AMA v. United States, 130 F.2d 233, 246-48 (D.C. Cir. 1942), affd mem.,
317 U.S. 519 (1943). See also United States v. Oregon State Medical Soc'y, 343 U.S. 326,
336 (1952); AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, RESEARCH MEMORANDUM SERIES, No. 12,
MINIMUM FEE SCHEDULES AND THE ANTI-TRUST LAWS: A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS (1958);
Note, Medical Societies and Medical Service Plans-From the Law of Association to the
1049
DUKE LA W JOURNAL
realtors argued that group action to enforce racial discrimination
was a "non-commercial" purpose and that the Sherman Act was
not intended to be an instrument to overturn social inequities.'
The court nevertheless held that the defendants' complaint pre-
sented a cause of action for unreasonable restraint of trade., How-
ever, neither Council of Defense nor Bratcher precludes formulation
of an exception for consumer action under extant antitrust law.
Council of Defense can be distinguished on the basis of the
defendant's destructive, anti-competitive purpose and the important
aspect of censorship involved. Similarly, the defendants'
discriminatory purpose in Bratcher was contrary to public policy as
revealed by the Constitution and recent civil rights legislation.
Bratcher, moreover, involved businessmen acting in their business
capacities, creating greater likelihood of future market collusion
than would an organization of consumers. Finally, the defendants
in both cases were formal bodies of apparently indefinite duration
and of demonstrated market power so that the possibility of a
profound and lasting anti-competitive effect on market conditions
was significantly greater than would be true of a localized,
spontaneous combination of consumers who intend to disband
when the objectionable practice was removed from the
marketplace.2 "
Law of Antitrust, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 694 (1955). But see AMA v. United States, 317 U.S.
519 (1943) (convictions of individual physicians under the Sherman Act affirmed; no finding
as to whether physician's practice was a "trade" within Sherman Act); Marcus, supra note
171, at 184-203.
191381 F.2d 723 (6th Cir. 1967); see 41 TE.MP. L.Q., supra note 171, cf. United States v.
Beaty, 288 F.2d 653 (6th Cir. 1961) (use of economic pressure to discourage Negro
registration properly enjoined under Civil Rights Act of 1957; illegitimate purpose); Note,
Private Economic Coercion and the Civil Rights Act of 1957, 71 YALE L.J. 537 (1962).
"1381 F.2d at 724. But cf. Marcus, supra note 171; Comment, Application of the
Sherman Act to Housing Segregation, 63 YALE L.J. 1124 (1954). "[A] restraint which is
concerned with, and generally understood as, a 'social' wrong should not be immune from
the anti-trust laws if it has economic significance." Marcus, supra at 174.
" 381 F.2d at 724; cf. Grillo v. Board of Realtors, 91 N.J. Super. 202, 219 A.2d 635
(1966) (private common law action); 18 W. REs. L. REv. 321 (1966).
Council oJ Defense and Bratcher do suggest, however, that consumer organizations
which attain public acceptance and recognized economic power are susceptible to an
injunction and possible liability for damages. Thus, consumer organizations should avoid
restricting communication between businessmen as to their respective business practices or
threatening retaliation if businessmen join a rival organization. Similarly, no attempt should
be made to block individual members of the consumer organization from dealing with an
offending merchant, either physically or through subtle coercion. Cf Note, Boycott of
Doctor Excluded from County Medical Bureau, 4 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REV. 223 (1962).
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It would appear entirely consistent with the purpose of the
Sherman Act to proscribe concerted refusals to deal by
businessmen acting in a business context while simultaneously
sanctioning identical efforts by consumers!"' This is so not only
because the act has been applied almost exclusively to businessmen
in a commercial framework 02 and arguably was designed only to
regulate concentrations of market power wielded by businessmen,2 3
but also because, as suggested above, any anti-competitive effects
accompanying consumer pressure are only temporary and do not
forestall market entry by new competitors. Moreover, to the extent
that fraudulent Pr misleading business practice is removed from the
marketplace, competition is at least theoretically furthered, whereas
the opposite is supposedly true where a competitor is removed by
the concerted action of other merchants. Finally, permitting joint
consumer action would serve to lessen the economic disparity
M01 See United States v. United States Trotting Ass'n, 1960 Trade Cas. 76,954 (S.D. Ohio
1960); Community Blood Bank, [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 17,728
(FTC 1966) (3-2 DECISION), rev'd, 405 F.2d 1011 (8th Cir. 1969).
Defendant's rules and regulations . . . are not such commercial boycotts as have
been stricken down in previous cases as unlawful per se. 1960 Trade Cas. at 76,955
(emphasis added).
The principle that boycotts are forbidden without inquiry into either competitive
effects or possible justifications is sound. But, like all principles, there are limits
beyond which it should not be pushed. The antitrust laws are concerned with the
regulation of business behavior . . . and most boycott cases have involved such
behavior.
[T]hough there is precedent for applying the antitrust laws to boycotts growing out
of other than commercial or competitive problems or conflicts, we should be cautious
in assuming that the same per se rule of illegality that is applied to the more usual
business boycott is applicable here.
While we are on safe ground in assuming that the public policy of this country is
opposed to permitting purely economic or business judgments to be delegated to
private groups armed with the sanction of a concerted refusal to deal, we are on more
tenuous ground in assuming a like public policy where professional and other
noncommercial judgments and issues are concerned. Community Blood Bank, supra
at 23,041-42 (Commissioner Elman, dissenting). See also id. at 23,050.
(Commissioner Jones, concurring).
21 See OPPENHEIM & WESTON 530 & n.37; Coons, supra note 148, at 726-29; cf. United
States v. National Ass'n of Real Estate Bds.; 339 U.S. 485, 492 (1950) (emphasis placed on
commercial activity for profit).
2See Apex Hosiery v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 489, 493 (1940). See notes 196 & 201
supra.
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between consumers and merchants, moving closer to the market
ideal of equality of bargaining power.'"'
Even those opposed to the Coons approach concede that the
defendants' purpose does seem to have some effect on the outcome
of antitrust litigation and that concerted action to remove a market
restriction is more likely to be judicially approved than action to
erect market barriers..2 15 It is arguable, nevertheless, that the restraint
on trade is no less harmful to the individual or to society when
imposed for commendable reasons. 06 Assuming this to be so, the
public's interest in a fair market and the free exchange of accurate
market information, as well as the importance to our society of the
guarantee of free speech, would seem to outweigh the potential
harm to society, at least where the consumers act in good faith to
inform other purchasers and to remove an objectionable practice
rather than to destroy a particular merchant.
Should the "proper purpose" defense fail, a federal antitrust
action might also be successfully resisted by resorting to the de
minimus argument. Although interstate goods need not necessarily
be involved, purely local restraints must create "interstate effects"
before the federal antitrust laws become operative.0 7 Thus, in
Konecky v. Jewish Pres'"° an editor of a weekly newspaper brought
an action for conspiracy, alleging that the defendant's activities,
which included a boycott, violated section 2 of the Sherman Act."I
In affirming dismissal, the Eighth Circuit stated that a conspiracy
2"1 ]./ I.P.C. Distributors. Inc. v. Moving Picture Machine Operators Local 110. 132 IK.
Supp. 294. 299 (N.D. Ill. 1955) (union can lose antitrust exemption if not acting in self-interest
and in pursuit of legitimate objectives): REPORT 01- THE ATrORNI!Y GINI RAI.'s NATIO\AI.
COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAws 306 (1955) (agricultural cooperatives exempted
from antitrust laws to offset weakness in bargaining power of individual farmer).
Marcus, supra note 171, at 215.
21 Id. at 174-75; see Community Blood Bank. [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRAI! Rio6.
REP. 17,728 (FTC 1966). rev'd, 405 F.2d 1011 (8th Cir. 1969): Walden, supra note 185,
at 1248. But see Community Blood Bank, supra at 23,041-42 (Commissioner Elman,
dissenting); note 201 supra.
" REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COIMITTEE TO STUDY TIlM
ANTITRUST LAWS 64 (1955); see Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 485, 500-01
(1940) (must affect market prices): I.P.C. Distributors. Inc. v. Moving Picture Machine
Operators Local 110, 132 F. Supp. 294, 298 (N.D. Ill. 1955) (defendant need not be in interstate
commerce if his acts restrain interstate commerce).
- 288 F. 179 (8th Cir. 1923).
15 U.S.C. § 2 (1964). No evidence of defendant's purpose was presented since the'
action was dismissed on the pleadings. 288 F. at 182.
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condemned by the Sherman Act was one in which the "direct
intent and effect . . is a restraint upon interstate commerce, and
not one where the effect is merely incidental.' '210 Conceding that
national circulation of plaintiff's newspaper constituted interstate
commerce, the court nevertheless found that the effect on commerce
of defendant's boycott and related activities was remote and
incidental. 2 1 It is interesting to note that the court thought it "far-
fetched" to discern an intent to monopolize on the basis of the
defendant's multifarious activities 12 Where the consumer boycott
is confined to the locale of'the offending merchant, therefore, the de
minimus defense would seem to be available.213 Actions under state
antitrust laws would probably remain a limited threat, however 14
In summary, the more organized and economically powerful a
group of consumers becomes, the greater the likelihood of a
successful federal antitrust suit being brought against them.
Accordingly, a spontaneous movement having a limited, but
"proper," purpose and existence would be more appropriate for
direct concerted action than would a formal and permanent
consumer organization 15 Nevertheless, the potent policy arguments
which consumers can urge in persuading a court that joint efforts
to remove an ignominious market practice is a reasonable restraint
of trade, the potential viability of a consumer "non-commercial
purpose" defense, and the realistic possibility that requisite
"interstate effects" will not be present, suggest that a federal
antitrust suit does not offer a serious threat to consumers.
Blackmail and Duress
Probably one of the most efficacious means of obtaining
21 288 F. at 181 (emphasis added).
222 Id. at 181-82. The defendant also engaged in the circulatioi of'false reports, the hiring
of detectives to shadow the plaintiff, and the inducing of employees to join the conspiracy.
Id. at 180.
212 id. at 182.
2I But cf. Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 192-93 (1968). "[lit is true that labor
conditions in businesses' having only a few employees engaged in commerce or production
may not affect commerce very much or very often. . . . [However] [t]he contention that in
Commerde Clause cases the courts have power to excise, as trivial, individual instances
falling within a rationally defined class of activities has been put entirely to rest." Id.; Wick-
ard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
2" Not all states permit suits for private antitrust violations, see Flynn, Criminal Sanctions
Under State and Federal Antitrust'Laws, 45 Tax. L. REV. 1301, 1343-46 (1967), and there
are few public actions brought under the state statutes, id. at 1306-07.-13 10-11.
222 See note 200 supra and accompanying text.
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merchant redress is simply threatening a law suit, particularly
where effected through the offices of an attorney. Where the
consumer acts on a good faith belief in his claim, his only apparent
legal 'pitfalls are the crimes of blackmail or extortion, or a possible
tort liability for "duress," the misuse of legal procedure 1 6
To be guilty of common law blackmail or statutory extortion,
one must threaten to accuse another of a crime or put the other in
fear of injury to his person, property, or character. 7 For this
reason the consumer would be free to threaten not only civil action
but also to report the events to a regulatory agency or government
official, except, perhaps, where the merchant's conduct constituted
a crime properly within the prosecutorial powers of that agency or
official 1 Moreover, some courts have approved threats of
criminal prosecution in order to obtain payment of a valid claim
arising out of the offense charged.2 1 1
Where the consumer threatens civil action based on a bona fide
claim, virtually all jurisdictions would presumably deny tort
recovery for duress, even if the claim were subsequently
"I See generally PROSSER §§ 114-15.
211 See R. PERKINS. CRIMINAL LAW 324-27 (1957).
2I" Blackmail or extortion commonly occurs where the defendant threatens to disclose the
crime of another to a public prosecutor. Nevertheless, the rationale which operates in that
instance-that "[t]he law does not contemplate the use of criminal process as a means of
collectinga debt"-would seem equally applicable where an agency official is charged with
enforcing a regulatory statute, even though the actual prosecution is handled by a
government prosecutor. People v. Beggs, 178 Cal. 79, 84, 172 P. 152, 154 (1918). See
generally United States v. Pignatelli, 125 F.2d 643, 646 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 680
(1942); Lindenbaum v. State Bar, 26 Cal. 2d 565, 160 P.2d 9 (1945); State v. Phillips, 62
Idaho 656, 115 P.2d 418 (1941); People v. Fichtner, 281 App. Div. 159, 118 N.Y.S.2d 392
(1952), affd men., 305 N.Y. 864, 114 N.E.2d 212 (1953); In re Sherin, 27 S.D. 232, 130
N.W. 761, modified, 28 S.D. 420, 133 N.W. 701 (1911). Thus, if as a means of securing
personal redress, a consumer threatens to report to the appropriate regulatory agency, a
merchant who is in violation of a penal statute, he may assume some risk of prosecution
for extortion or blackmail.
2I In State v. Hammond, 80 Ind. 80 (1881) and similar cases it has beeh held that the
crime of blackmail is not committed when a threat to accuse a debtor of a crime is made in
order to induce the payment of money justly due. Under this theory a defrauded consumer,
to induce compensation, could threaten a merchant with a prosecution if he were willing to
assume the risk that he was rightfully due compensation. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Jones,
121 Mass. 57 (1876); State v. Ricks, 108 Miss. 7, 66 So. 281 (1914); State v. Barger, III
Ohio St. 448, 145 N.E. 857 (1924); Mann v. State, 47 Ohio St. 556, 26 N.E. 226 (1890);
State v. Burns, 161 Wash. 362, 370-73, 297 P. 212, 214-15 (1931); Annot., 135 A.L.R. 728,
735 (1941); R. PERKINS, supra note 217, at 326.
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disproved ° In discussing duress in a contractual setting, several
courts have maintained that threat of a suit is never wrong in a
civil context;22' however, the majority of jurisdictions and most
commentators have agreed that immunity should be lifted where
the claim is groundless or if the threatened party is seriously
disadvantaged due to a substantial physical, economic, or mental
disparity between the disputants 2  Indeed, in most cases where
relief is granted, there are extenuating circumstances, frequently
involving undue harassment.2 2
"I See Dalzell, Duress by Economic Pressure I1, 20 N.C.L. REV. 341, 345-46 (1942);
Comment, Threat of Litigation as Duress, 6 ARK. L. REV. 472, 479, 482 (1952).
Any conclusions reached as to tort recovery for duress are necessarily tentative, based as
they need be almost entirely on contract cases involving duress. See note 220 infra and
accompanying text. Nevertheless, courts have long maintained that it can scarcely be
improper to threaten to do what one has a legal right to do, see Dawson, Duress Through
Civil Litigation: 1, 45 MICH. L. REV. 571, 579 & n.8 (1947); Dalzell, supra, at 347 & n.151
note 221 infra, and this principle would appear equally reasonable in a tort context.
"I E.g., Ochiuto v. Prudential Ins. Co., 356 Pa. 382, 52 A.2d 228 (1947).
The factors generally cited in support of the view that it is never wrong to threaten to do
what one has a legal right to do include: (1) that the sole purpose of duress is to prevent
unjust enrichment; (2) that the rule protects the security of transactions; (3) that the rule
leads to the private settlement of claims, thereby reducing court congestion; and (4) that the
tactic is equally available to both parties. Dawson, supra note 220, at 571, 573-78. The
doctrine has been criticized as offering insufficient protection to coerced parties where the
oppressor's acts fall short of criminal or tortious behavior. Dawson, Economic Duress-An
Essay in Perspective, 45 MICH. L. REV. 253, 287-88 (1947).
2 See, e.g., Brown v. T.V. and Radio Artists Local 55, 191 F. Supp. 676 (N.D. Cal.
1961); Beatty v. United States, 168 F: Supp. 204 (Ct. Cl. 1958); Dalzell, Duress by
Economic Pressure I, 20 N.C.L. REV. 234, 245 (1942); Dawson, Duress Through Civil
Litigation: I, II, 45 MICH. L, REV. 571, 586, 594-95, 598, 695-96, 704, 715 (1947) (bad faith,
improper means, or ends, disparity of bargaining power); 6 ARK. L. REV., supra note 220, at
483; 32 TULANE L. REV. 512, 514-15 (1958); cf Crew v. W.T. Smith Lumber Co., 268 Ala.
628, 109 So. 2d 721 (1959) (threat unaccompanied by trespass not actionable); Bell Bakeries,
Inc. v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 245 N.C. 408, 96 S.E.2d 408 (1957) (generally not
duress to threaten to do what one has a legal right to do); Bluestone v. Jones, 233 N.Y.S.2d
146 (Sup. Ct. 1962) (same); Steward v. World-Wide Auto. Corp., 20 Misc. 2d 188, 189
N.Y.S.2d 540 (Sup. Ct. 1959) (same); Dawson, Economic Duress-An Essay in Perspective,
45 MICH. L. REV. 253, 289-90 (1947) ("The shift in emphasis that is now proposed involves
the assumption that our courts cannot remain indifferent . ..to excessive and unjustified
gains that are directly traceable to disparity in bargaining power"). But cf. Evaul v. Board
of Educ., 65 N.J. Super. 68, 167 A.2d 39 (1961) (duress determined by state of mind
engendered in victim, not by the unlawful conduct).
"It is never duress to institute or threaten to institute civil suits where the threat to do so
is made in the honest belief that a good cause of action exists.
"A party is always entitled to say that if his offer is not accepted, he will avail himself of
his legal rights." Beatty v. United States, 168 F. Supp. 204, 206 (Ct. Cl. 1958).
2 See Parker v. Hill, 85 Ark. 363, 108 S.W. 208 (1908) (continual harassment of elderly
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Since no tort cases on point were discovered,224 prediction is
speculative. However, it would appear that in the absence of
evidence of abuse of legal process225  or infliction of mental
suffering, a consumer "benefitted" by a good faith claim could
freely communicate to the merchant, personally or through an
attorney, his intention to initiate legal action should satisfactory
adjustment not be forthcoming. 26
CONCLUSION
Ethical businessmen are adequately protected against dishonest,
vengeful, or unjustifiably disappointed consumers by existing law.
Injunctions may be obtained against misleading or violent
picketing, particularly if conducted in furtherance of a scheme to
destroy the merchant's business. Where the elements of defamation,
disparagement, contractual interference, or "duress" are present,
damages may be recovered, perhaps including punitive damages.
Should a consumer organization become too powerful or act
arbitrarily, the federal antitrust laws may be utilized to enjoin the
offensive activities or to recover treble damages. At all times,,
lady based on bad faith claim); 6 ARK. L. REV., supra note 220, at 481; cf. RESTATEMENT OF
CONTRACTS § 493, at 948 (1932) (example 16: cannot be oppressive or unconscionable in
demands).
22, Several courts have awarded tort damages or spoken in terms of a tortious act when
duress is alleged, but almost all of these cases involved a disputed contract and none of the
courts based recovery solely on an intentional tort theory. See Pittman v. Lageschulte, 45 Ill.
App. 2d 207, 195 N.E.2d 394 (1963); Slade v. Slade, 310 Il1. App. 77, 33 N.E.2d 951 (1941);
Gellhorn, Limitations on Contract Terminations Rights-Franchise Cancellations, 1967
DuKe L.J. 465, 485-86 ("the opaque doctrine of economic duress"). The only case which
might bear directly on the question of intentional tort recovery for threat of legal action is
Neibuhr v. Gage, 99 Minn. 149, 108 N.W. 884 (1906). There the plaintiff was threatened
with criminal prosecution and not a civil suit. The former constitutes blackmail and the
general policy against such behavior as expressed in existing penal sanctions for blackmail
would argue in favor of tort recovery in that instance. However, public policy is not so
clearly against threats of civil action, and, indeed, most courts are inclined to protect such
activity. See notes 220-23 supra and accompanying text. Presumably, therefore, if there is a
distinct tort recovery for the threat of civil litigation, the plaintiff must be able to
demonstrate extenuating circumstances, perhaps comparable to those attendant a showing of
intentional infliction of mental distress.
2"See PROSSER § 115. According to Prosser, abuse of process requires the misapplication
of legal writs, such as garnishment or attachment, for a purpose other than that for which
the writ was designed, or for an "improper" purpose. Id. at 876-77.
22'See Beatty v. United States, 168 F. Supp. 204, 206 (Ct. Cl. 1958); note 222 supra. But
see Dalzell, supra note 220, at 366 (threat to maintain lawsuit later disproven ought to be
actionable duress).
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moreover, businessmen may neutralize .consumer-fomented adverse
publicity by using comparable tactics, explaining or disputing the
allegations made.27
At the same time, present law is not overly restrictive and does
not threaten a consumer with a bona fide complaint. For this
reason such consumers ought to be encouraged to initiate non-
legal self-help in a reasonable manner. The consumer must ever
be aware, however, that his motive may be crucial. Actions
designed to alter questionable practices or to gain personal redress
are likely to be sanctioned whereas identical behavior aimed at
removing a merchant from the marketplace may be proscribed.
Consequently, it is advisable for consumers contemplating direct
action to make their purpose clear through letters, a purpose clause
in an organizational agreement, or in conversations with the
offending merchant and friends. A finder of fact, moreover, may be
favorably affected by evidence that the consumers informed the
merchant throughout the dispute as to their intended plans, thereby
giving him an opportunity to change his stance and alleviate all or
further injury.
Any analysis of the rights of both parties cannot ignore the
practical reality that the consumer's greatest asset is the
businessman's fear of damaging publicity, whether arising from the
attention called to his business practices by protesting consumers or
from his initiation of a law tiit 28 Thus, the motives of the rankled
consumer and the seriousness of the offense charged must be
considered by the courts in attempting to balance the interests of
both parties. Otherwise the cost of doing business could become too
substantial for the small businessman and the possibility of
consumer tyranny could loom very real.
27 As a practical matter, depending upon the neighborhood, the reputation of the
complainant and the reputation of the merchant, there may be a natural tendency to
disbelieve the charges of an irate consumer.
2 Unfortunately, apprehension of harmful publicity is probably experienced the least by
that group of merchants most prone to engage in shoddy business practices-the "fly-by-
night" operators who move from community to community selling inferior products or
fraudulent home improvement plans door-to-door. Cf. D. CAPLOVITZ, supra note 1, at 58-80.
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